The Viability of Blockchain Markets under Discrete Clearing and Paid Priority
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866917505610547200 |
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| author | Capponi, Agostino Cartea, Álvaro Drissi, Fayçal |
| author_facet | Capponi, Agostino Cartea, Álvaro Drissi, Fayçal |
| contents | This paper develops a model to evaluate the viability of blockchain markets as the sole venue for price formation. Blockchains clear at discrete intervals called block time, and transactions are executed sequentially according to priority fees paid by traders who compete for queue position. We show that these features undermine the viability of markets. Paid-priority ordering induces endogenous selection, where only traders with sufficiently high valuations participate. The participation cutoff rises with competition, which intensifies with lower information costs or higher liquidity demand. This hinders price discovery and biases prices. It also impairs liquidity: the cutoff concentrates trading among aggressive traders and increases adverse selection that liquidity suppliers absorb in a single clearing round. Although longer block times enhance consensus security, they amplify these effects and can cause markets to shut down. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_17425 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Viability of Blockchain Markets under Discrete Clearing and Paid Priority Capponi, Agostino Cartea, Álvaro Drissi, Fayçal General Finance General Economics Economics Trading and Market Microstructure This paper develops a model to evaluate the viability of blockchain markets as the sole venue for price formation. Blockchains clear at discrete intervals called block time, and transactions are executed sequentially according to priority fees paid by traders who compete for queue position. We show that these features undermine the viability of markets. Paid-priority ordering induces endogenous selection, where only traders with sufficiently high valuations participate. The participation cutoff rises with competition, which intensifies with lower information costs or higher liquidity demand. This hinders price discovery and biases prices. It also impairs liquidity: the cutoff concentrates trading among aggressive traders and increases adverse selection that liquidity suppliers absorb in a single clearing round. Although longer block times enhance consensus security, they amplify these effects and can cause markets to shut down. |
| title | The Viability of Blockchain Markets under Discrete Clearing and Paid Priority |
| topic | General Finance General Economics Economics Trading and Market Microstructure |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.17425 |