:: Library Catalog

Cover Image

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Chan, Hau, Lin, Jianan, Qin, Zining, Wang, Chenhao
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.18626
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Mechanism Design for Extending the Accessibility of Facilities
by: Chan, Hau, et al.
Published: (2024)

Obnoxious Facility Location Problems: Strategyproof Mechanisms Optimizing $L_p$-Aggregated Utilities and Costs
by: Chan, Hau, et al.
Published: (2025)

Strategyproof Facility Location with Prediction: Minimizing the Maximum Cost
by: Chan, Hau, et al.
Published: (2025)

Centralized Group Equitability and Individual Envy-Freeness in the Allocation of Indivisible Items
by: Wang, Ying, et al.
Published: (2025)

Distance Preservation Games
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2025)

Reinforcement Nash Equilibrium Solver
by: Wang, Xinrun, et al.
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design for Automated Market Makers
by: Chan, T-H. Hubert, et al.
Published: (2024)

Role-Selection Game in Block Production under Proposer-Builder Separation
by: Li, Yanzhen, et al.
Published: (2025)

A QoE-Driven Personalized Incentive Mechanism Design for AIGC Services in Resource-Constrained Edge Networks
by: Wu, Hongjia, et al.
Published: (2025)

Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Probabilistic Mechanism Design in Diffusion Auctions
by: Zhang, Xinlun, et al.
Published: (2026)

Online Selection with Uncertain Disruption
by: Xu, Yihua, et al.
Published: (2025)

Contract Design Under Approximate Best Responses
by: Bacchiocchi, Francesco, et al.
Published: (2025)

Incentivizing User Data Contributions for LLM Improvement under Withdrawal Rights
by: Feng, Di, et al.
Published: (2026)

Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals
by: Leme, Renato Paes, et al.
Published: (2023)

Double Oracle Neural Architecture Search for Game Theoretic Deep Learning Models
by: Aung, Aye Phyu Phyu, et al.
Published: (2024)

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions
by: Balkanski, Eric, et al.
Published: (2023)

Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
by: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Published: (2025)

Contracting with a Mechanism Designer
by: Bai, Tian, et al.
Published: (2025)

Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets
by: Zheng, Yusen, et al.
Published: (2024)

In-Context Exploiter for Extensive-Form Games
by: Li, Shuxin, et al.
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
by: Bhawalkar, Kshipra, et al.
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design for Congested Facility Location
by: Peng, Cheng, et al.
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities on Budgets
by: Zheng, Yusen, et al.
Published: (2025)

Mechanism Design for LLM Fine-tuning with Multiple Reward Models
by: Sun, Haoran, et al.
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design for Quality-Preserving LLM Advertising
by: Han, Jiale, et al.
Published: (2026)

Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
by: Amanatidis, Georgios, et al.
Published: (2025)

Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2025)

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers
by: Lucier, Brendan, et al.
Published: (2025)

Incentive Mechanism for Uncertain Tasks under Differential Privacy
by: Jiang, Xikun, et al.
Published: (2023)

Facility Location Mechanism Design: Breaking The Deterministic Barrier
by: Barak, Zohar
Published: (2026)

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
by: Chen, Xi, et al.
Published: (2022)

Diffusion Mechanism Design in Tree-Structured Social Network
by: Yu, Feiyang
Published: (2024)

Learning Bayesian Game Families, with Application to Mechanism Design
by: Gatchel, Madelyn, et al.
Published: (2025)

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols
by: Garimidi, Pranav, et al.
Published: (2025)

Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings
by: Curry, Michael, et al.
Published: (2024)

Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
by: Wu, Ke, et al.
Published: (2023)

Mechanism Design via Market Clearing-Prices for Value Maximizers under Budget and RoS Constraints
by: Liu, Xiaodong, et al.
Published: (2026)

Facility Assignment with Fair Cost Sharing: Equilibrium and Mechanism Design
by: Ma, Mengfan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Connected Trading Cycles
by: Song, Xinwei, et al.
Published: (2023)