Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19402 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866918510405353472 |
|---|---|
| author | Huang, Shengtang Li, Xin Mao, Songtao Zhou, Zhaienhe |
| author_facet | Huang, Shengtang Li, Xin Mao, Songtao Zhou, Zhaienhe |
| contents | Pseudorandom codes (PRCs), introduced by Christ and Gunn (CRYPTO '2024), are error-correcting codes whose codewords are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random strings, while still being decodable by someone holding the key. They provide a natural primitive for robust and undetectable watermarking, particularly in applications to AI-generated content. Although recent works have obtained strong results for substitution errors, the edit-error setting remains much less understood, especially in the high-rate regime and over small alphabets.
We study public-key pseudorandom codes against edit errors. First, we give a new reduction showing that binary zero-bit PRCs robust against a constant fraction of substitution errors can be transformed into binary zero-bit PRCs robust against edit errors. Consequently, under any assumption that yields zero-bit Hamming-robust PRCs, one also obtains zero-bit PRCs for edit channels, albeit only for the weaker class of sublinear polynomial edit channels, namely channels with edit error rate $1/n^γ$ for any constant $γ>0$.
In the high-rate regime, we construct public-key PRCs with rate arbitrarily close to $1$ over sufficiently large constant alphabets, and with rate arbitrarily close to $1/2$ over the binary alphabet. Moreover, if we allow the alphabet size to be $\mathrm{poly}(λ)$, where $λ$ is the security parameter, then our public-key PRCs can attain the Singleton bound for insertion-deletion channels. Taken together, these results yield the first high-rate public-key binary PRC constructions for edit channels, under the same assumption that yields zero-bit Hamming-robust PRCs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_19402 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | High-Rate Public-Key Pseudorandom Codes for Edit Errors Huang, Shengtang Li, Xin Mao, Songtao Zhou, Zhaienhe Cryptography and Security Pseudorandom codes (PRCs), introduced by Christ and Gunn (CRYPTO '2024), are error-correcting codes whose codewords are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random strings, while still being decodable by someone holding the key. They provide a natural primitive for robust and undetectable watermarking, particularly in applications to AI-generated content. Although recent works have obtained strong results for substitution errors, the edit-error setting remains much less understood, especially in the high-rate regime and over small alphabets. We study public-key pseudorandom codes against edit errors. First, we give a new reduction showing that binary zero-bit PRCs robust against a constant fraction of substitution errors can be transformed into binary zero-bit PRCs robust against edit errors. Consequently, under any assumption that yields zero-bit Hamming-robust PRCs, one also obtains zero-bit PRCs for edit channels, albeit only for the weaker class of sublinear polynomial edit channels, namely channels with edit error rate $1/n^γ$ for any constant $γ>0$. In the high-rate regime, we construct public-key PRCs with rate arbitrarily close to $1$ over sufficiently large constant alphabets, and with rate arbitrarily close to $1/2$ over the binary alphabet. Moreover, if we allow the alphabet size to be $\mathrm{poly}(λ)$, where $λ$ is the security parameter, then our public-key PRCs can attain the Singleton bound for insertion-deletion channels. Taken together, these results yield the first high-rate public-key binary PRC constructions for edit channels, under the same assumption that yields zero-bit Hamming-robust PRCs. |
| title | High-Rate Public-Key Pseudorandom Codes for Edit Errors |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19402 |