Image de couverture de livre

When Do Markets Work? Multiplex Networks and Efficiency

Fuente: arXiv

Enregistré dans:

Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Li, Chengqing, Zenou, Yves, Zhou, Junjie
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2026
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

Documents similaires

Welfare and Distributional Effects of Joint Intervention in Networks
par: Kor, Ryan, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Price Regulation and Network Spillovers
par: Li, Chengqing, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Sequential Network Design
par: Sun, Yang, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
par: Feng, Di
Publié: (2023)

Influence and Connectivity in Networks: A Generating Function Approach
par: Sun, Yang, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Doing Less for More: Consumer Search and Undertreatment in Credence Service Markets
par: Xu, Xiaoyan, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Multilateral Market Power in Input-Output Networks
par: Bizzarri, Matteo
Publié: (2026)

Interconnected Contests
par: Dziubiński, Marcin, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Persuasion in Networks: Can the Sender Do Better than Using Public Signals?
par: Zhang, Yifan
Publié: (2024)

When to Request Evidence?
par: Espitia, Andres, et autres
Publié: (2026)

When is Trust Robust?
par: Anderlini, Luca, et autres
Publié: (2024)

The Design of Monopoly Information Broker
par: Chen, Junjie, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Strategy-proof Market Segmentation against Price Discrimination
par: Kuang, Zhonghong, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Predicting Financial Market Crises using Multilayer Network Analysis and LSTM-based Forecasting of Spillover Effects
par: Sefidi, Mahdi Kohan
Publié: (2025)

Dynamic Market Design
par: Che, Yeon-Koo
Publié: (2026)

Persuasion in Lemons Markets
par: Paolo, Andrea Di Giovan, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Incentive Pareto Efficiency in Monopoly Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection
par: Andraos, Maria, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Aggregate Efficiency in Games
par: Mudekereza, Florian
Publié: (2025)

When Sellers Are Uncertain about Quality
par: Kuwahara, Keita
Publié: (2026)

Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
par: Cantillon, Estelle, et autres
Publié: (2022)

When and Where To Submit A Paper
par: Luo, Daniel
Publié: (2024)

Distributional Preferences for Market Design
par: Echenique, Federico, et autres
Publié: (2026)

The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets
par: Ortega, Josué, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Equal Pay for Similar Work
par: GentilePassaro, Diego, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Redistribution Through Market Segmentation
par: Augias, Victor, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Limits of Disclosure in Search Markets
par: Boleslavsky, Raphael, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Market Design with Distributional Objectives
par: Hafalir, Isa E., et autres
Publié: (2022)

Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
par: Arieli, Itai, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Unambiguous Efficiency of Random Allocations
par: Heo, Eun Jeong, et autres
Publié: (2024)

When and what to learn in a changing world
par: Barilla, César
Publié: (2025)

Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters
par: Ko, Hyeonggyun
Publié: (2025)

Random Matching Markets with Correlated Preferences
par: Wang, Bill
Publié: (2026)

Waiting for Trade in Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty
par: Preusser, Justus
Publié: (2025)

The (Mis)use of Information in Decentralised Markets
par: Akkar, D. Carlos
Publié: (2025)

Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets
par: Caspari, Gian, et autres
Publié: (2021)

Reactive Marketing and the Co-Production of (In)Authenticity
par: Desai, Preyas S., et autres
Publié: (2025)

Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences
par: Sandholtz, Will, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements
par: Grigoryan, Aram, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Competitive Markets with Imperfectly Discerning Consumers
par: Spiegler, Yair Antler ad Ran
Publié: (2024)

Monotone Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Signaling
par: Han, Seungjin, et autres
Publié: (2021)