Chain Reactions: How Nonce Collisions in ECDSA Compromise Polygon MEV Searchers
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866910242047000576 |
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| author | Madhwal, Yash Seoev, Andrey Della Pietra, Raffaele Smirnova, Anastasiia Yanovich, Yury |
| author_facet | Madhwal, Yash Seoev, Andrey Della Pietra, Raffaele Smirnova, Anastasiia Yanovich, Yury |
| contents | ECDSA signatures form the bedrock of blockchain transaction authentication, yet their security critically depends on proper nonce generation. We uncover a critical vulnerability in the Polygon MEV ecosystem: systematic nonce reuse that enables complete private key recovery. Analyzing on-chain data reveals that searchers, driven by the need for sub-second response times in sealed-bid auctions, employ predictable nonce patterns. These patterns create linear relationships between signatures, allowing passive attackers to recover private keys using elementary algebra. We provide a compact linear-system formulation for such attacks, including the dangerous case of cross-wallet nonce collisions, and present concrete evidence of exploitable patterns on Polygon. Our findings demonstrate how protocol-induced latency pressures can lead to catastrophic cryptographic failures in production blockchain systems, where a single implementation error compromises multiple accounts simultaneously. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_21498 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Chain Reactions: How Nonce Collisions in ECDSA Compromise Polygon MEV Searchers Madhwal, Yash Seoev, Andrey Della Pietra, Raffaele Smirnova, Anastasiia Yanovich, Yury Cryptography and Security ECDSA signatures form the bedrock of blockchain transaction authentication, yet their security critically depends on proper nonce generation. We uncover a critical vulnerability in the Polygon MEV ecosystem: systematic nonce reuse that enables complete private key recovery. Analyzing on-chain data reveals that searchers, driven by the need for sub-second response times in sealed-bid auctions, employ predictable nonce patterns. These patterns create linear relationships between signatures, allowing passive attackers to recover private keys using elementary algebra. We provide a compact linear-system formulation for such attacks, including the dangerous case of cross-wallet nonce collisions, and present concrete evidence of exploitable patterns on Polygon. Our findings demonstrate how protocol-induced latency pressures can lead to catastrophic cryptographic failures in production blockchain systems, where a single implementation error compromises multiple accounts simultaneously. |
| title | Chain Reactions: How Nonce Collisions in ECDSA Compromise Polygon MEV Searchers |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.21498 |