Warhead Verification with Neutron Beams and Electric Cryptography
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866914584510595072 |
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| author | Kowitt, Nolan Moore, Michael Sanchez, Kevin Zalavadia, Mital Danagoulian, Areg |
| author_facet | Kowitt, Nolan Moore, Michael Sanchez, Kevin Zalavadia, Mital Danagoulian, Areg |
| contents | Future arms control treaties may need to reliably verify warheads for dismantlement as part of the treaty verification process without exposing carefully guarded weapons information. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis has been proposed as a strategy to verify the authenticity of nuclear warheads and warhead components slated for dismantlement in an arms control verification exercise. Most actinides have resonant neutron absorption lines in the eV region, so by measuring the energy resolved transmission of neutrons and observing the resulting isotope-specific absorption lines, the authenticity of a nuclear device can be verified. To ensure acceptance of this technique by treaty partners, the measurement should minimize information learned about the warhead, including both geometric and isotopic features. Past implementations of transmission analysis acquired and compared neutron time-of-flight spectra. We have developed an analog electric cryptographic measurement proof of concept system where only counts in specific resonance energy windows are observed. The system uses discrete analog components, producing a complete data acquisition and analysis circuit. By limiting the design to easily verifiable parts, the entire apparatus is transparent to authentication and certification. The information security provided by this analog measurement technique may make it the verification basis of future ambitious arms control treaties that explicitly stipulate the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_21505 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Warhead Verification with Neutron Beams and Electric Cryptography Kowitt, Nolan Moore, Michael Sanchez, Kevin Zalavadia, Mital Danagoulian, Areg Applied Physics Instrumentation and Detectors Future arms control treaties may need to reliably verify warheads for dismantlement as part of the treaty verification process without exposing carefully guarded weapons information. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis has been proposed as a strategy to verify the authenticity of nuclear warheads and warhead components slated for dismantlement in an arms control verification exercise. Most actinides have resonant neutron absorption lines in the eV region, so by measuring the energy resolved transmission of neutrons and observing the resulting isotope-specific absorption lines, the authenticity of a nuclear device can be verified. To ensure acceptance of this technique by treaty partners, the measurement should minimize information learned about the warhead, including both geometric and isotopic features. Past implementations of transmission analysis acquired and compared neutron time-of-flight spectra. We have developed an analog electric cryptographic measurement proof of concept system where only counts in specific resonance energy windows are observed. The system uses discrete analog components, producing a complete data acquisition and analysis circuit. By limiting the design to easily verifiable parts, the entire apparatus is transparent to authentication and certification. The information security provided by this analog measurement technique may make it the verification basis of future ambitious arms control treaties that explicitly stipulate the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. |
| title | Warhead Verification with Neutron Beams and Electric Cryptography |
| topic | Applied Physics Instrumentation and Detectors |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.21505 |