bioETH-PRS: Confidential Polygenic Risk Scoring without a Trusted Evaluator via Fully Homomorphic Encryption on a Programmable Blockchain

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Provatas, Kimon Antonios, Galanopoulos, Christos, Georgakopoulos-Soares, Ilias
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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author Provatas, Kimon Antonios
Galanopoulos, Christos
Georgakopoulos-Soares, Ilias
author_facet Provatas, Kimon Antonios
Galanopoulos, Christos
Georgakopoulos-Soares, Ilias
contents Polygenic risk scores (PRSs) aggregate genetic effect estimates to predict disease susceptibility, yet clinical deployment often exposes raw genotype data to third-party compute infrastructure. Prior homomorphic-encryption approaches, still require trust in a designated evaluator. We present bioETH-PRS, a protocol that replaces that evaluator role with immutable smart contracts on a blockchain supporting Fully Homomorphic Encryption (fhEVM). Using the integer-exact TFHE scheme, bioETH-PRS computes the PRS dot product entirely within the encrypted domain, keeping both genotype dosage vectors and GWAS weight vectors hidden from external parties throughout execution. We introduce a three-step fixed-point quantisation scheme for representing signed GWAS weights as unsigned 64-bit integers, achieving machine-epsilon reconstruction accuracy on validated fixtures. A four-contract architecture separates data custody, model publication, computation, and output release, and supports both a classic chunked path and a streaming path, with the latter reducing mock-measured gas by 37%. An on-chain noisy output oracle emits an encrypted noisy-score handle and a publicly decryptable ternary category, reducing raw score exposure and probing risk. Prototype evaluation on real GWAS fixtures confirms linear gas scaling and suggests that the approach may be cost-competitive in low-gas deployment environments.
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spellingShingle bioETH-PRS: Confidential Polygenic Risk Scoring without a Trusted Evaluator via Fully Homomorphic Encryption on a Programmable Blockchain
Provatas, Kimon Antonios
Galanopoulos, Christos
Georgakopoulos-Soares, Ilias
Genomics
Polygenic risk scores (PRSs) aggregate genetic effect estimates to predict disease susceptibility, yet clinical deployment often exposes raw genotype data to third-party compute infrastructure. Prior homomorphic-encryption approaches, still require trust in a designated evaluator. We present bioETH-PRS, a protocol that replaces that evaluator role with immutable smart contracts on a blockchain supporting Fully Homomorphic Encryption (fhEVM). Using the integer-exact TFHE scheme, bioETH-PRS computes the PRS dot product entirely within the encrypted domain, keeping both genotype dosage vectors and GWAS weight vectors hidden from external parties throughout execution. We introduce a three-step fixed-point quantisation scheme for representing signed GWAS weights as unsigned 64-bit integers, achieving machine-epsilon reconstruction accuracy on validated fixtures. A four-contract architecture separates data custody, model publication, computation, and output release, and supports both a classic chunked path and a streaming path, with the latter reducing mock-measured gas by 37%. An on-chain noisy output oracle emits an encrypted noisy-score handle and a publicly decryptable ternary category, reducing raw score exposure and probing risk. Prototype evaluation on real GWAS fixtures confirms linear gas scaling and suggests that the approach may be cost-competitive in low-gas deployment environments.
title bioETH-PRS: Confidential Polygenic Risk Scoring without a Trusted Evaluator via Fully Homomorphic Encryption on a Programmable Blockchain
topic Genomics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.21634