Intercloud: Eventual Consistency for Decentralised Economies via Chilling-Effect Consensus
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866911706835320832 |
|---|---|
| author | Magarshak, Gregory |
| author_facet | Magarshak, Gregory |
| contents | We present Intercloud, a decentralised economic network in which streams of private data are secured by Watcher swarms that observe only cryptographic hashes, never plaintext. Intercloud requires no global consensus beyond a single shared random seed per epoch. Two mechanisms provide security: (i) ripple deduplication via epoch-stamped identifiers, preventing any ripple from propagating through the same node twice per epoch, guaranteeing termination without global coordination; and (ii) chilling-effect consensus, in which a swarm reaches finality by attesting to the absence of conflicting evidence rather than voting between alternatives. Any conflicting attestation automatically yields a self-certifying Proof of Corruption.
We prove four main results. First, execution ripples terminate in bounded time via the ripple-ID mechanism. Second, a swarm of about 35 Watchers -- assigned by a verifiable random function, independent of total network size -- suffices for double-spending prevention, matching Hoepman's lower bound. Third, two correct clients can hold conflicting finality attestations only if the adversary compromises a supermajority of the assigned swarm or eclipses both clients from all honest nodes; we prove necessity and sufficiency. Fourth, Buridan's Principle does not apply: the consensus question is absence of evidence, not a binary choice on a continuous input.
We also develop a complete economic model. Local coins are issued and retired by currency streams; security weight tracks value automatically as Intercoin weight adjusts at each epoch shuffle. Junior nodes detect corruption and earn lottery rewards for propagating Proofs of Corruption; vesting makes corruption economically irrational. The coin and content layers are strictly separated: regulators observe weight flows without learning amounts, coin types, identities, or rules. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_22830 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Intercloud: Eventual Consistency for Decentralised Economies via Chilling-Effect Consensus Magarshak, Gregory Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Cryptography and Security Computer Science and Game Theory 68M14, 91B26, 94A60, 68M12 C.2.4; H.3.4; K.6.5 We present Intercloud, a decentralised economic network in which streams of private data are secured by Watcher swarms that observe only cryptographic hashes, never plaintext. Intercloud requires no global consensus beyond a single shared random seed per epoch. Two mechanisms provide security: (i) ripple deduplication via epoch-stamped identifiers, preventing any ripple from propagating through the same node twice per epoch, guaranteeing termination without global coordination; and (ii) chilling-effect consensus, in which a swarm reaches finality by attesting to the absence of conflicting evidence rather than voting between alternatives. Any conflicting attestation automatically yields a self-certifying Proof of Corruption. We prove four main results. First, execution ripples terminate in bounded time via the ripple-ID mechanism. Second, a swarm of about 35 Watchers -- assigned by a verifiable random function, independent of total network size -- suffices for double-spending prevention, matching Hoepman's lower bound. Third, two correct clients can hold conflicting finality attestations only if the adversary compromises a supermajority of the assigned swarm or eclipses both clients from all honest nodes; we prove necessity and sufficiency. Fourth, Buridan's Principle does not apply: the consensus question is absence of evidence, not a binary choice on a continuous input. We also develop a complete economic model. Local coins are issued and retired by currency streams; security weight tracks value automatically as Intercoin weight adjusts at each epoch shuffle. Junior nodes detect corruption and earn lottery rewards for propagating Proofs of Corruption; vesting makes corruption economically irrational. The coin and content layers are strictly separated: regulators observe weight flows without learning amounts, coin types, identities, or rules. |
| title | Intercloud: Eventual Consistency for Decentralised Economies via Chilling-Effect Consensus |
| topic | Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Cryptography and Security Computer Science and Game Theory 68M14, 91B26, 94A60, 68M12 C.2.4; H.3.4; K.6.5 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.22830 |