Arrow-Type Impossibility for Genuinely Modal Judgments
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866914591121866752 |
|---|---|
| author | Nagai, Yutaka Ono, Hirotaka |
| author_facet | Nagai, Yutaka Ono, Hirotaka |
| contents | Judgment aggregation studies how to combine individual judgments on logically related propositions into a collective judgment. Classical impossibility results show that sufficiently strong logical interconnections force dictatorship under natural aggregation axioms. In this paper, we ask whether such impossibility can still arise when the objects of aggregation are required to be genuinely modal judgments rather than plain factual propositions. Since modal logic contains propositional logic, this question is meaningful only if one excludes fact-based aggregation in disguise. We show that Arrow-type impossibility already re-emerges in a strikingly sparse modal setting. We prove an impossibility theorem on a simple cyclic frame for an agenda generated from a single propositional variable by repeated applications of a single modal operator, and we further demonstrate this phenomenon for an alternative family of frames satisfying a natural symmetry condition. Thus, even under a modal-operator requirement, semantic structure alone can generate the logical interconnections needed for dictatorship. Technically, our analysis has two layers. First, we prove a semantic reduction theorem showing that certain iterated modal patterns can be collapsed by shifting the evaluation point. Second, building on this reduction, we identify a local-to-global frame mechanism by which frame geometry yields minimally inconsistent modal judgment sets and the strong path-connectivity required for impossibility. The same reduction also turns consistency checking into a small combinatorial covering problem, which yields efficient implementations of non-dictatorial aggregation procedures. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_23321 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Arrow-Type Impossibility for Genuinely Modal Judgments Nagai, Yutaka Ono, Hirotaka Logic in Computer Science Multiagent Systems Judgment aggregation studies how to combine individual judgments on logically related propositions into a collective judgment. Classical impossibility results show that sufficiently strong logical interconnections force dictatorship under natural aggregation axioms. In this paper, we ask whether such impossibility can still arise when the objects of aggregation are required to be genuinely modal judgments rather than plain factual propositions. Since modal logic contains propositional logic, this question is meaningful only if one excludes fact-based aggregation in disguise. We show that Arrow-type impossibility already re-emerges in a strikingly sparse modal setting. We prove an impossibility theorem on a simple cyclic frame for an agenda generated from a single propositional variable by repeated applications of a single modal operator, and we further demonstrate this phenomenon for an alternative family of frames satisfying a natural symmetry condition. Thus, even under a modal-operator requirement, semantic structure alone can generate the logical interconnections needed for dictatorship. Technically, our analysis has two layers. First, we prove a semantic reduction theorem showing that certain iterated modal patterns can be collapsed by shifting the evaluation point. Second, building on this reduction, we identify a local-to-global frame mechanism by which frame geometry yields minimally inconsistent modal judgment sets and the strong path-connectivity required for impossibility. The same reduction also turns consistency checking into a small combinatorial covering problem, which yields efficient implementations of non-dictatorial aggregation procedures. |
| title | Arrow-Type Impossibility for Genuinely Modal Judgments |
| topic | Logic in Computer Science Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23321 |