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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dupuy, Arnaud
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23539
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author Dupuy, Arnaud
author_facet Dupuy, Arnaud
contents We study how individuals trade off outcome ("what") and process ("how") utility in high-stakes strategic decisions, namely professional tennis. Using optimality conditions and the second-service rule, we derive a sufficient condition for the nonparametric lower bound on the weight of process utility to be positive. Under mild shape restrictions, the high-frequency data indicate that most players likely value process utility positively. We then develop a structural model that recovers player-specific preferences over outcomes and processes. Estimates show that players systematically sacrifice success probabilities to increase process utility, with economically meaningful consequences for match outcomes and expected earnings.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_23539
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Process Utility in High-Stakes Competition
Dupuy, Arnaud
Econometrics
We study how individuals trade off outcome ("what") and process ("how") utility in high-stakes strategic decisions, namely professional tennis. Using optimality conditions and the second-service rule, we derive a sufficient condition for the nonparametric lower bound on the weight of process utility to be positive. Under mild shape restrictions, the high-frequency data indicate that most players likely value process utility positively. We then develop a structural model that recovers player-specific preferences over outcomes and processes. Estimates show that players systematically sacrifice success probabilities to increase process utility, with economically meaningful consequences for match outcomes and expected earnings.
title Process Utility in High-Stakes Competition
topic Econometrics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23539