CachePrune: Privacy-Aware and Fine-Grained KV Cache Sharing for Efficient LLM Inference
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866917524608647168 |
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| author | Wu, Guanlong li, Zhaohan Zhang, Yao Zhang, Zheng Niu, Jianyu Wu, Ye Zhang, Yinqian |
| author_facet | Wu, Guanlong li, Zhaohan Zhang, Yao Zhang, Zheng Niu, Jianyu Wu, Ye Zhang, Yinqian |
| contents | Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on Key-Value (KV) caching to accelerate inference, and many serving systems further share the KV cache across users' requests to reduce redundant computation. While widely adopted, unrestricted cross-user sharing introduces side-channel vulnerabilities, allowing an adversary to infer user inputs by probing for cache reuse. Existing defenses disable sharing entirely to prevent leakage; yet such a coarse-grained strategy sacrifices substantial reuse potential, since prompts often include large portions of privacy-irrelevant segments, such as system instructions or publicly accessible materials. Building on this, we present CachePrune, a privacy-aware KV cache sharing mechanism that enables fine-grained reuse of KV entries across requests. Realizing such fine granularity requires token-level cache management, as reusable segments vary in length and position due to sensitivity masking, making reuse more complex than the fixed-size or sentence-level chunking used in existing coarse-grained schemes. Specifically, CachePrune makes fine-grained reuse practical by addressing two key challenges: accurately and efficiently deriving reusable KV segments and efficiently retrieving them over variable-length spans. We implement CachePrune on top of vLLM and evaluate it on three datasets, showing that it eliminates direct leakage through KV cache reuse side channels while reducing TTFT by 4.5x and increasing cache hit rates by 44% compared with state-of-the-art approaches. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_23640 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | CachePrune: Privacy-Aware and Fine-Grained KV Cache Sharing for Efficient LLM Inference Wu, Guanlong li, Zhaohan Zhang, Yao Zhang, Zheng Niu, Jianyu Wu, Ye Zhang, Yinqian Cryptography and Security Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on Key-Value (KV) caching to accelerate inference, and many serving systems further share the KV cache across users' requests to reduce redundant computation. While widely adopted, unrestricted cross-user sharing introduces side-channel vulnerabilities, allowing an adversary to infer user inputs by probing for cache reuse. Existing defenses disable sharing entirely to prevent leakage; yet such a coarse-grained strategy sacrifices substantial reuse potential, since prompts often include large portions of privacy-irrelevant segments, such as system instructions or publicly accessible materials. Building on this, we present CachePrune, a privacy-aware KV cache sharing mechanism that enables fine-grained reuse of KV entries across requests. Realizing such fine granularity requires token-level cache management, as reusable segments vary in length and position due to sensitivity masking, making reuse more complex than the fixed-size or sentence-level chunking used in existing coarse-grained schemes. Specifically, CachePrune makes fine-grained reuse practical by addressing two key challenges: accurately and efficiently deriving reusable KV segments and efficiently retrieving them over variable-length spans. We implement CachePrune on top of vLLM and evaluate it on three datasets, showing that it eliminates direct leakage through KV cache reuse side channels while reducing TTFT by 4.5x and increasing cache hit rates by 44% compared with state-of-the-art approaches. |
| title | CachePrune: Privacy-Aware and Fine-Grained KV Cache Sharing for Efficient LLM Inference |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23640 |