Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.24165 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866916041014116352 |
|---|---|
| author | Lyon, Harper Lev, Omer Mattei, Nicholas |
| author_facet | Lyon, Harper Lev, Omer Mattei, Nicholas |
| contents | Peer selection, the evaluation and selection of agents by their peers, is an important problem in the field of computational social choice; with applications to grading in massively online courses (MOOCs) and academic peer review. Current existing algorithmic and empirical work focuses on developing and analyzing novel \emph{strategyproof} mechanisms, wherein no agent has an incentive to misreport their evaluations. However, the majority of published mechanisms share a flaw: they do not \emph{reward} agents for any effort expended during the evaluation process. In cases where high quality evaluations are costly to produce this missing incentive fails to align agents with an overall goal of accurate selection. To address this gap we first prove theoretically that incentivizing effort in peer selection requires information beyond a single evaluation. We then propose \textsc{PeerBTS}, a mechanism that combines a peer-prediction lottery, leveraging work on the Robust Bayesian Truth Serum, with any existing peer-selection mechanism to incentivize effort while remaining Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We find that while an incentive-compatible peer-selection mechanism using agent predictions to incentivize effort is possible it requires adjustments to the assumed problem context and limits other mechanistics properties. We additionally present a series of non-strategic simulations to validate incentives and evaluate the performance of PeerBTS relative to existing strategyproof peer selection mechanisms. Finally, we discuss the results of an initial study on the validity of peer-prediction from a small academic workshop. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_24165 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | PeerBTS: Incentivizing Effort in Strategyproof Peer Selection Lyon, Harper Lev, Omer Mattei, Nicholas Computer Science and Game Theory 91A80, 91B10, 91B12, 91B14 J.4; I.2 Peer selection, the evaluation and selection of agents by their peers, is an important problem in the field of computational social choice; with applications to grading in massively online courses (MOOCs) and academic peer review. Current existing algorithmic and empirical work focuses on developing and analyzing novel \emph{strategyproof} mechanisms, wherein no agent has an incentive to misreport their evaluations. However, the majority of published mechanisms share a flaw: they do not \emph{reward} agents for any effort expended during the evaluation process. In cases where high quality evaluations are costly to produce this missing incentive fails to align agents with an overall goal of accurate selection. To address this gap we first prove theoretically that incentivizing effort in peer selection requires information beyond a single evaluation. We then propose \textsc{PeerBTS}, a mechanism that combines a peer-prediction lottery, leveraging work on the Robust Bayesian Truth Serum, with any existing peer-selection mechanism to incentivize effort while remaining Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. We find that while an incentive-compatible peer-selection mechanism using agent predictions to incentivize effort is possible it requires adjustments to the assumed problem context and limits other mechanistics properties. We additionally present a series of non-strategic simulations to validate incentives and evaluate the performance of PeerBTS relative to existing strategyproof peer selection mechanisms. Finally, we discuss the results of an initial study on the validity of peer-prediction from a small academic workshop. |
| title | PeerBTS: Incentivizing Effort in Strategyproof Peer Selection |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory 91A80, 91B10, 91B12, 91B14 J.4; I.2 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.24165 |