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PeerBTS: Incentivizing Effort in Strategyproof Peer Selection

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Lyon, Harper, Lev, Omer, Mattei, Nicholas
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2026
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory 91A80, 91B10, 91B12, 91B14 J.4; I.2
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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