:: Library Catalog

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Fairstein, Roy, Lyon, Harper, Damty, Oshri, Lev, Omer, Mattei, Nicholas, Gal, Kobi
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2026
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory 91A80, 91B10, 91B12, 91B14 J.4; I.2
Accès en ligne:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.24222
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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