Reframing LLM Agent Security as an Agent-Human Interaction Problem
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| author | Wang, Peiran Li, Ying Tian, Yuan |
| author_facet | Wang, Peiran Li, Ying Tian, Yuan |
| contents | We argue that LLM agent security is fundamentally an agent-human interaction (AHI) problem, not a purely algorithmic one. To substantiate this position, we conduct a systematic analysis of 59 academic papers, 21 production agent systems, and 26 security plugins as of April 2026. Our analysis reveals a striking pattern: the three widely deployed human-centric security mechanisms (policy specification, runtime approval, and scope configuration) dominate industry practice, each adopted by at least 14 of 21 systems (14, 15, and 16, respectively), while the categories most heavily studied in academia (intent anchoring and trust labeling) see zero production deployment. Yet current human participation mechanisms are far from satisfactory: they suffer from a fundamental trade-off between cognitive burden and security guarantees, leaving users caught between approval fatigue and uncontrolled agent autonomy. We make three contributions. First, through a systematic comparison of LLM-based and human-based intent alignment, we argue that human participation in agent security decisions is indispensable given current capabilities. Second, we quantify a pronounced industry-academia mismatch: the security mechanisms that practitioners actually deploy receive scant research attention, while the approaches that researchers favor remain undeployed. Third, we propose a three-direction research agenda and call for AHI security to be recognized as a first-class research citizen, one that demands its own design principles, evaluation methods, and theoretical foundations. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_24309 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reframing LLM Agent Security as an Agent-Human Interaction Problem Wang, Peiran Li, Ying Tian, Yuan Cryptography and Security We argue that LLM agent security is fundamentally an agent-human interaction (AHI) problem, not a purely algorithmic one. To substantiate this position, we conduct a systematic analysis of 59 academic papers, 21 production agent systems, and 26 security plugins as of April 2026. Our analysis reveals a striking pattern: the three widely deployed human-centric security mechanisms (policy specification, runtime approval, and scope configuration) dominate industry practice, each adopted by at least 14 of 21 systems (14, 15, and 16, respectively), while the categories most heavily studied in academia (intent anchoring and trust labeling) see zero production deployment. Yet current human participation mechanisms are far from satisfactory: they suffer from a fundamental trade-off between cognitive burden and security guarantees, leaving users caught between approval fatigue and uncontrolled agent autonomy. We make three contributions. First, through a systematic comparison of LLM-based and human-based intent alignment, we argue that human participation in agent security decisions is indispensable given current capabilities. Second, we quantify a pronounced industry-academia mismatch: the security mechanisms that practitioners actually deploy receive scant research attention, while the approaches that researchers favor remain undeployed. Third, we propose a three-direction research agenda and call for AHI security to be recognized as a first-class research citizen, one that demands its own design principles, evaluation methods, and theoretical foundations. |
| title | Reframing LLM Agent Security as an Agent-Human Interaction Problem |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.24309 |