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Main Authors: Zhong, Fangtian, Qian, Zhuoyun, Ren, Mengfei, Jiang, Yili, Huang, Jiaqi, Pang, Yunming, Cheng, Xiuzhen
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25923
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author Zhong, Fangtian
Qian, Zhuoyun
Ren, Mengfei
Jiang, Yili
Huang, Jiaqi
Pang, Yunming
Cheng, Xiuzhen
author_facet Zhong, Fangtian
Qian, Zhuoyun
Ren, Mengfei
Jiang, Yili
Huang, Jiaqi
Pang, Yunming
Cheng, Xiuzhen
contents Packer identification tools are a critical foundation of malware analysis, directly affecting unpacking, behavioral analysis, malware classification, and threat attribution. However, their semantic correctness is rarely validated. In practice, a tool may return a plausible packer label that is nevertheless semantically wrong, leading to failed unpacking and unreliable downstream analysis. This paper presents a semantic validation framework for testing and repairing packer identification tools. Our key idea is to use unpackers as executable semantic contracts. If a tool predicts a packer family, the corresponding unpacker should recover analyzable program content. This enables automatic test oracles without requiring manually labeled ground truth. Building on this idea, we develop a systematic pipeline for detecting, localizing, and repairing semantic faults in existing packer identification tools. We then conduct the first large-scale empirical study of semantic bugs in eleven open-source packer identification tools and six proprietary VirusTotal tools. Our results reveal that semantic bugs are widespread and recurring, largely due to incomplete signatures and unstable heuristic logic. After repair, packer identification coverage improves by up to 58.6%, and downstream malware classification performance improves by more than 13.6% on average. These findings show that semantic validation of packer identification tools is essential for building trustworthy malware analysis pipelines.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_25923
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Semantic Validation of Packer Identification Tools: Characterization, Repair, and Downstream Impact
Zhong, Fangtian
Qian, Zhuoyun
Ren, Mengfei
Jiang, Yili
Huang, Jiaqi
Pang, Yunming
Cheng, Xiuzhen
Cryptography and Security
Packer identification tools are a critical foundation of malware analysis, directly affecting unpacking, behavioral analysis, malware classification, and threat attribution. However, their semantic correctness is rarely validated. In practice, a tool may return a plausible packer label that is nevertheless semantically wrong, leading to failed unpacking and unreliable downstream analysis. This paper presents a semantic validation framework for testing and repairing packer identification tools. Our key idea is to use unpackers as executable semantic contracts. If a tool predicts a packer family, the corresponding unpacker should recover analyzable program content. This enables automatic test oracles without requiring manually labeled ground truth. Building on this idea, we develop a systematic pipeline for detecting, localizing, and repairing semantic faults in existing packer identification tools. We then conduct the first large-scale empirical study of semantic bugs in eleven open-source packer identification tools and six proprietary VirusTotal tools. Our results reveal that semantic bugs are widespread and recurring, largely due to incomplete signatures and unstable heuristic logic. After repair, packer identification coverage improves by up to 58.6%, and downstream malware classification performance improves by more than 13.6% on average. These findings show that semantic validation of packer identification tools is essential for building trustworthy malware analysis pipelines.
title Semantic Validation of Packer Identification Tools: Characterization, Repair, and Downstream Impact
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25923