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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.26367 |
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| _version_ | 1866916046792818688 |
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| author | Sandholtz, Will Tai, Andrew |
| author_facet | Sandholtz, Will Tai, Andrew |
| contents | We study stochastic object assignment problems in which objects may have minimum and maximum requirements, such as with classes with upper and lower enrollment bounds. We construct a new random assignment mechanism, the minimums probabilistic serial (MPS) mechanism, which generalizes the Probabilistic Serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). The random allocation produced by MPS is guaranteed to be Pareto efficient; that is, there is no other implementable allocation that all agents prefer via first order stochastic dominance. We also show that MPS is i) envy-free, in that no agent will strictly prefer another agent's assignment, and ii) weak strategyproof, in that agents cannot achieve a better assignment by misreporting their preferences. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_26367 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Random Matching with Minimums Sandholtz, Will Tai, Andrew Theoretical Economics J.4 We study stochastic object assignment problems in which objects may have minimum and maximum requirements, such as with classes with upper and lower enrollment bounds. We construct a new random assignment mechanism, the minimums probabilistic serial (MPS) mechanism, which generalizes the Probabilistic Serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). The random allocation produced by MPS is guaranteed to be Pareto efficient; that is, there is no other implementable allocation that all agents prefer via first order stochastic dominance. We also show that MPS is i) envy-free, in that no agent will strictly prefer another agent's assignment, and ii) weak strategyproof, in that agents cannot achieve a better assignment by misreporting their preferences. |
| title | Random Matching with Minimums |
| topic | Theoretical Economics J.4 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.26367 |