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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27163 |
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| _version_ | 1866918524727853056 |
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| author | Gois, Antonio Gunluk, Sophia Rosenfeld, Nir Hegde, Nidhi Lacoste-Julien, Simon Sridhar, Dhanya |
| author_facet | Gois, Antonio Gunluk, Sophia Rosenfeld, Nir Hegde, Nidhi Lacoste-Julien, Simon Sridhar, Dhanya |
| contents | In strategic classification, an institution (e.g., a bank) anticipates adaptation from users who change their features to increase utility in a classification task (e.g., loan repayment). Since a key challenge is the distribution shift induced by users, we turn to causal models, which have been shown to bound the worst-case out-of-distribution (OOD) risk, and establish several new results that link causality and strategic classification. First, we show that causal classification leads to optimal classification error after any sufficiently large adaptation, when the noise is bounded in a certain way. Second, when these assumptions do not hold, we show OOD cross-entropy risk of optimal classifiers decomposes into an OOD bias term and a term arising from not using all observable features, allowing us to understand when causal classifiers have an advantage. Finally, we show that the use of causal features can allow alignment of long-term incentives between institutions and users, contrasting with previous work that highlights social costs of such approaches. We validate our theory empirically on synthetic data, finding that our results predict behavior in practice. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_27163 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Role of Causal Features in Strategic Classification for Robustness and Alignment Gois, Antonio Gunluk, Sophia Rosenfeld, Nir Hegde, Nidhi Lacoste-Julien, Simon Sridhar, Dhanya Machine Learning I.2.6; G.3 In strategic classification, an institution (e.g., a bank) anticipates adaptation from users who change their features to increase utility in a classification task (e.g., loan repayment). Since a key challenge is the distribution shift induced by users, we turn to causal models, which have been shown to bound the worst-case out-of-distribution (OOD) risk, and establish several new results that link causality and strategic classification. First, we show that causal classification leads to optimal classification error after any sufficiently large adaptation, when the noise is bounded in a certain way. Second, when these assumptions do not hold, we show OOD cross-entropy risk of optimal classifiers decomposes into an OOD bias term and a term arising from not using all observable features, allowing us to understand when causal classifiers have an advantage. Finally, we show that the use of causal features can allow alignment of long-term incentives between institutions and users, contrasting with previous work that highlights social costs of such approaches. We validate our theory empirically on synthetic data, finding that our results predict behavior in practice. |
| title | The Role of Causal Features in Strategic Classification for Robustness and Alignment |
| topic | Machine Learning I.2.6; G.3 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27163 |