Algorithmic Monocultures in Hiring

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Bommasani, Rishi, Bana, Sarah H., Creel, Kathleen A., Jurafsky, Dan, Liang, Percy
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Bommasani, Rishi
Bana, Sarah H.
Creel, Kathleen A.
Jurafsky, Dan
Liang, Percy
author_facet Bommasani, Rishi
Bana, Sarah H.
Creel, Kathleen A.
Jurafsky, Dan
Liang, Percy
contents Many employers screen job applicants with algorithms built by the same few algorithm vendors. We hypothesize that algorithmic monoculture leads to the same individuals and members of the same racial groups facing rejection. We acquire and analyze a novel dataset of 3 million applicants submitting 4 million applications where all the applications are screened by algorithms built by the same vendor. We find clear racial disparities in applicant outcomes. Of all applications submitted by Asian and Black applicants, 14.74% and 25.87% are submitted to positions that adversely impact Asian and Black applicants, respectively, according to U.S. employment discrimination standards. Individuals also receive homogeneous outcomes: 4% of all applicants who apply to 10 positions are recommended for rejection from all positions, a rate higher than expected by chance. To better understand this homogeneity, we leverage the deterministic replicability of hiring algorithms to generate the outcomes applicants would have received if they applied to all positions. We show that applicants would need to apply widely in order to ensure their applications are considered by a human
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_27371
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Algorithmic Monocultures in Hiring
Bommasani, Rishi
Bana, Sarah H.
Creel, Kathleen A.
Jurafsky, Dan
Liang, Percy
Computers and Society
Artificial Intelligence
Many employers screen job applicants with algorithms built by the same few algorithm vendors. We hypothesize that algorithmic monoculture leads to the same individuals and members of the same racial groups facing rejection. We acquire and analyze a novel dataset of 3 million applicants submitting 4 million applications where all the applications are screened by algorithms built by the same vendor. We find clear racial disparities in applicant outcomes. Of all applications submitted by Asian and Black applicants, 14.74% and 25.87% are submitted to positions that adversely impact Asian and Black applicants, respectively, according to U.S. employment discrimination standards. Individuals also receive homogeneous outcomes: 4% of all applicants who apply to 10 positions are recommended for rejection from all positions, a rate higher than expected by chance. To better understand this homogeneity, we leverage the deterministic replicability of hiring algorithms to generate the outcomes applicants would have received if they applied to all positions. We show that applicants would need to apply widely in order to ensure their applications are considered by a human
title Algorithmic Monocultures in Hiring
topic Computers and Society
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27371