Silent Consent, Persistent Risk: Android Permission Groups and Custom Permissions
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866916052728807424 |
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| author | Akanji, Olawale Amos Egele, Manuel Stringhini, Gianluca |
| author_facet | Akanji, Olawale Amos Egele, Manuel Stringhini, Gianluca |
| contents | Android's permission system is designed to balance usability with informed consent, yet two legacy mechanisms still undermine that balance in Android 16: (i) permission groups that silently auto-grant new permissions within a group after a user's initial approval, and (ii) normal-level custom permissions that are auto-granted at install and enable cross-app access with no user visibility. We conduct a longitudinal analysis of 19.3 million APKs spanning 5.97 million unique apps (distinct package identifiers) from the AndroZoo repository, combined with on-device validation on Android 16. Among 2,244,575 multi-version apps, 381,026 (17%) silently gain permissions within already-granted groups. Using VirusTotal detections with primary threshold t=20, apps flagged as malware expand within groups at a higher rate than benign apps (odds ratio = 1.35, p < 0.001); the association holds across every tested threshold and concentrates in permission-heavy apps (OR = 2.06 in the top quartile). We also identify 307 cross-developer normal-custom-permission pairs that expose contacts, SMS, location, authentication credentials, user identity, and medical records to unrelated apps without any user prompt. A lightweight prototype built on public Android APIs recorded 23 silent expansion events across 13 apps during a 96-day single-device pilot, showing that update-time transparency is reachable without OS modification. Our results show that consent erosion persists despite a decade of platform hardening and affects apps ranging from obscure utilities to widely deployed and pre-installed software. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_27667 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Silent Consent, Persistent Risk: Android Permission Groups and Custom Permissions Akanji, Olawale Amos Egele, Manuel Stringhini, Gianluca Cryptography and Security D.4.6; K.6.5 Android's permission system is designed to balance usability with informed consent, yet two legacy mechanisms still undermine that balance in Android 16: (i) permission groups that silently auto-grant new permissions within a group after a user's initial approval, and (ii) normal-level custom permissions that are auto-granted at install and enable cross-app access with no user visibility. We conduct a longitudinal analysis of 19.3 million APKs spanning 5.97 million unique apps (distinct package identifiers) from the AndroZoo repository, combined with on-device validation on Android 16. Among 2,244,575 multi-version apps, 381,026 (17%) silently gain permissions within already-granted groups. Using VirusTotal detections with primary threshold t=20, apps flagged as malware expand within groups at a higher rate than benign apps (odds ratio = 1.35, p < 0.001); the association holds across every tested threshold and concentrates in permission-heavy apps (OR = 2.06 in the top quartile). We also identify 307 cross-developer normal-custom-permission pairs that expose contacts, SMS, location, authentication credentials, user identity, and medical records to unrelated apps without any user prompt. A lightweight prototype built on public Android APIs recorded 23 silent expansion events across 13 apps during a 96-day single-device pilot, showing that update-time transparency is reachable without OS modification. Our results show that consent erosion persists despite a decade of platform hardening and affects apps ranging from obscure utilities to widely deployed and pre-installed software. |
| title | Silent Consent, Persistent Risk: Android Permission Groups and Custom Permissions |
| topic | Cryptography and Security D.4.6; K.6.5 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27667 |