A Surveillance Evasion Game with Continuous Sensor Redeployment via Bilevel Optimization
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913166699528192 |
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| author | Kim, Jaehyeok Pant, Kartik A. Kinerson, Joseph Sommer-Kohrt, Kylie Sribunma, Worawis Lin, Li-Yu Goppert, James M. |
| author_facet | Kim, Jaehyeok Pant, Kartik A. Kinerson, Joseph Sommer-Kohrt, Kylie Sribunma, Worawis Lin, Li-Yu Goppert, James M. |
| contents | Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UASs) have become a growing threat to the security of critical infrastructure, exploiting spatiotemporal gaps in sensor perimeters to infiltrate restricted airspace undetected. We formulate this interaction as a two-player zero-sum differential game between an adversarial UAS and a heterogeneous sensor network of directional and omnidirectional sensors. Unlike earlier game-theoretic approaches that restrict the defender to discrete placement graphs or fixed configurations, we introduce a continuous sensor redeployment technique in which each sensor slides freely along the convex building boundaries. This is enforced via a log-sum-exp smooth approximation that preserves differentiability at polygon vertices, enabling optimization with gradient-based methods. The attacker's best response is computed via a two-step approach combining STP-RRT* for feasible trajectory initialization and nonlinear programming for detection-minimization refinement. The joint optimization converges to a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) via alternating bilevel optimization, with analytical first-order stationarity conditions derived for both players, thereby establishing a deployable baseline for heterogeneous sensor placements in CUAS missions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_27917 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Surveillance Evasion Game with Continuous Sensor Redeployment via Bilevel Optimization Kim, Jaehyeok Pant, Kartik A. Kinerson, Joseph Sommer-Kohrt, Kylie Sribunma, Worawis Lin, Li-Yu Goppert, James M. Robotics Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UASs) have become a growing threat to the security of critical infrastructure, exploiting spatiotemporal gaps in sensor perimeters to infiltrate restricted airspace undetected. We formulate this interaction as a two-player zero-sum differential game between an adversarial UAS and a heterogeneous sensor network of directional and omnidirectional sensors. Unlike earlier game-theoretic approaches that restrict the defender to discrete placement graphs or fixed configurations, we introduce a continuous sensor redeployment technique in which each sensor slides freely along the convex building boundaries. This is enforced via a log-sum-exp smooth approximation that preserves differentiability at polygon vertices, enabling optimization with gradient-based methods. The attacker's best response is computed via a two-step approach combining STP-RRT* for feasible trajectory initialization and nonlinear programming for detection-minimization refinement. The joint optimization converges to a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) via alternating bilevel optimization, with analytical first-order stationarity conditions derived for both players, thereby establishing a deployable baseline for heterogeneous sensor placements in CUAS missions. |
| title | A Surveillance Evasion Game with Continuous Sensor Redeployment via Bilevel Optimization |
| topic | Robotics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27917 |