Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913168059531264 |
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| author | Gradwohl, Ronen Hu, Fengming Smorodinsky, Rann |
| author_facet | Gradwohl, Ronen Hu, Fengming Smorodinsky, Rann |
| contents | We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We analyze two conceptually distinct notions: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge, but where the model's predictions are nonetheless accurate; and robustness, in which the sender also lacks precise knowledge, but where the outcome is insensitive to this ignorance. We model preference uncertainty as infinitesimally small, non-probabilistic (Knightian) uncertainty, and the sender's behavior as either minimizing the regret or maximizing the minimum utility. We show that continuity holds if and only if robustness holds, and that both notions are generic. Thus, while some instances of Bayesian persuasion are fragile, typical instances are both continuous and robust with respect to a small amount of ignorance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_28265 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences Gradwohl, Ronen Hu, Fengming Smorodinsky, Rann Theoretical Economics We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We analyze two conceptually distinct notions: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge, but where the model's predictions are nonetheless accurate; and robustness, in which the sender also lacks precise knowledge, but where the outcome is insensitive to this ignorance. We model preference uncertainty as infinitesimally small, non-probabilistic (Knightian) uncertainty, and the sender's behavior as either minimizing the regret or maximizing the minimum utility. We show that continuity holds if and only if robustness holds, and that both notions are generic. Thus, while some instances of Bayesian persuasion are fragile, typical instances are both continuous and robust with respect to a small amount of ignorance. |
| title | Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.28265 |