A Secure, Manifest-Based Framework for Delegated Privilege Promotion
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866913168719085568 |
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| author | Chowdhury, Rajarshi Shah, Akshay |
| author_facet | Chowdhury, Rajarshi Shah, Akshay |
| contents | Large-scale enterprise software systems commonly run as unprivileged service accounts to enforce least privilege, yet still depend on a small set of privileged components -- such as executables with elevated ownership, permissions, or capabilities -- for narrowly scoped operations. This creates a persistent security and operational conflict during maintenance. Automated patching tools running without elevated privileges cannot safely update privileged components without either executing the entire patch with full administrative rights or requiring manual administrator intervention. We present a secure, manifest-based infrastructure for delegated promotion of privileged software components, deployed in production as part of a large-scale enterprise database system serving both cloud and on-premises installations. The design centers on a minimal privileged mediator that validates cryptographically protected metadata and allows an unprivileged process to promote only vendor-approved files. The system explicitly mitigates Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) attacks using file-descriptor-bound validation and promotion, supports offline key rotation and revocation, and enables zero-downtime self-update via atomic replacement. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_28991 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Secure, Manifest-Based Framework for Delegated Privilege Promotion Chowdhury, Rajarshi Shah, Akshay Cryptography and Security Operating Systems D.4.6; K.6.5; D.2.7 Large-scale enterprise software systems commonly run as unprivileged service accounts to enforce least privilege, yet still depend on a small set of privileged components -- such as executables with elevated ownership, permissions, or capabilities -- for narrowly scoped operations. This creates a persistent security and operational conflict during maintenance. Automated patching tools running without elevated privileges cannot safely update privileged components without either executing the entire patch with full administrative rights or requiring manual administrator intervention. We present a secure, manifest-based infrastructure for delegated promotion of privileged software components, deployed in production as part of a large-scale enterprise database system serving both cloud and on-premises installations. The design centers on a minimal privileged mediator that validates cryptographically protected metadata and allows an unprivileged process to promote only vendor-approved files. The system explicitly mitigates Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) attacks using file-descriptor-bound validation and promotion, supports offline key rotation and revocation, and enables zero-downtime self-update via atomic replacement. |
| title | A Secure, Manifest-Based Framework for Delegated Privilege Promotion |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Operating Systems D.4.6; K.6.5; D.2.7 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.28991 |