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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29107 |
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| _version_ | 1866914620242919424 |
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| author | Nimase, Ojas Chen, Zhe Qi, Gengpei Zhao, Yue Hu, Xiyang |
| author_facet | Nimase, Ojas Chen, Zhe Qi, Gengpei Zhao, Yue Hu, Xiyang |
| contents | Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rank products, documents, and recommendations for user queries, which makes manipulating these rankings a growing concern for fairness and information integrity. Research on generative engine optimization (GEO) has produced many manipulation methods, but each is evaluated on its own dataset with its own metrics, so their relative strength and detectability stay unclear. We present GEO-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates GEO ranking-manipulation attacks under one protocol. It unifies black-box prompt-based attacks (TAP, Zero-Shot), white-box gradient-based attacks (STS, RAF, StealthRank), and ten white-hat C-SEO strategies. We score every method on five datasets against a fixed open-weight ranker (Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct), using metrics for both effectiveness (NRG, Success@α, Promote@α) and stealth (keyword violation rate, perplexity ratio). Our evaluation shows that effectiveness and stealth trade off across adversarial attacks, that black-box content rewriting matches or exceeds gradient-based attacks on rank promotion while producing more fluent text and can evade both keyword- and perplexity-based detection on some domains, and that the access model does not predict attack strength. By standardizing datasets, attack implementations, and metrics, GEO-Bench enables the first direct comparison across these attack paradigms and supports the development of detection methods. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_29107 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | GEO-Bench: Benchmarking Ranking Manipulation in Generative Engine Optimization Nimase, Ojas Chen, Zhe Qi, Gengpei Zhao, Yue Hu, Xiyang Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rank products, documents, and recommendations for user queries, which makes manipulating these rankings a growing concern for fairness and information integrity. Research on generative engine optimization (GEO) has produced many manipulation methods, but each is evaluated on its own dataset with its own metrics, so their relative strength and detectability stay unclear. We present GEO-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates GEO ranking-manipulation attacks under one protocol. It unifies black-box prompt-based attacks (TAP, Zero-Shot), white-box gradient-based attacks (STS, RAF, StealthRank), and ten white-hat C-SEO strategies. We score every method on five datasets against a fixed open-weight ranker (Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct), using metrics for both effectiveness (NRG, Success@α, Promote@α) and stealth (keyword violation rate, perplexity ratio). Our evaluation shows that effectiveness and stealth trade off across adversarial attacks, that black-box content rewriting matches or exceeds gradient-based attacks on rank promotion while producing more fluent text and can evade both keyword- and perplexity-based detection on some domains, and that the access model does not predict attack strength. By standardizing datasets, attack implementations, and metrics, GEO-Bench enables the first direct comparison across these attack paradigms and supports the development of detection methods. |
| title | GEO-Bench: Benchmarking Ranking Manipulation in Generative Engine Optimization |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29107 |