Relevance as a Vulnerability: How Web Retrieval Degrades Safety Alignment in LLM Agents
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| author | Nawal, Aditya Baser, Manit Gurusamy, Mohan |
| author_facet | Nawal, Aditya Baser, Manit Gurusamy, Mohan |
| contents | AI agents augment large language models with external tools such as web retrieval, enabling grounded and up-to-date responses. However, incorporating external content into the generation pipeline can weaken the safety alignment mechanisms that govern model outputs. Prior work shows that enabling retrieval in agents increases compliance with harmful requests. We introduce AgentREVEAL, a diagnostic framework for analyzing retrieval-induced safety degradation in LLM agents. The framework examines two axes: how retrieval is integrated into the agent pipeline and the properties of the retrieved content. Along the integration axis, we find that binding tool invocation and response generation in a single step amplifies harmful outputs. Along the content axis, we uncover the Safe Source Paradox: even oppositional or safety-oriented sources, such as pages containing warnings or risk disclaimers, can increase harmful compliance by an average of 25% compared to the no-retrieval baseline. Finally, we show that relevance acts as a shared activation condition for both vulnerabilities. Similar patterns appear on frontier closed models, and harmful compliance remains elevated under several representative pipeline interventions, with some agents also entering this regime under autonomous retrieval. Because relevance is also what makes retrieval useful, these results expose a safety-utility trade-off for retrieval-enabled agents. We introduce HarmURLBench, a benchmark containing 1,405 real-world URLs paired with 320 harmful behaviors to support future evaluations. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_29224 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Relevance as a Vulnerability: How Web Retrieval Degrades Safety Alignment in LLM Agents Nawal, Aditya Baser, Manit Gurusamy, Mohan Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security AI agents augment large language models with external tools such as web retrieval, enabling grounded and up-to-date responses. However, incorporating external content into the generation pipeline can weaken the safety alignment mechanisms that govern model outputs. Prior work shows that enabling retrieval in agents increases compliance with harmful requests. We introduce AgentREVEAL, a diagnostic framework for analyzing retrieval-induced safety degradation in LLM agents. The framework examines two axes: how retrieval is integrated into the agent pipeline and the properties of the retrieved content. Along the integration axis, we find that binding tool invocation and response generation in a single step amplifies harmful outputs. Along the content axis, we uncover the Safe Source Paradox: even oppositional or safety-oriented sources, such as pages containing warnings or risk disclaimers, can increase harmful compliance by an average of 25% compared to the no-retrieval baseline. Finally, we show that relevance acts as a shared activation condition for both vulnerabilities. Similar patterns appear on frontier closed models, and harmful compliance remains elevated under several representative pipeline interventions, with some agents also entering this regime under autonomous retrieval. Because relevance is also what makes retrieval useful, these results expose a safety-utility trade-off for retrieval-enabled agents. We introduce HarmURLBench, a benchmark containing 1,405 real-world URLs paired with 320 harmful behaviors to support future evaluations. |
| title | Relevance as a Vulnerability: How Web Retrieval Degrades Safety Alignment in LLM Agents |
| topic | Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29224 |