BadBone: Backdoor Attacks Against Backbone Models in Visual Prompt Learning
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866911732188839936 |
|---|---|
| author | Yang, Ziqing Wen, Rui He, Xinlei Shen, Yun Backes, Michael Zhang, Yang |
| author_facet | Yang, Ziqing Wen, Rui He, Xinlei Shen, Yun Backes, Michael Zhang, Yang |
| contents | Prompt learning is a new machine learning paradigm that has attracted ample attention due to its simplicity and proven efficacy. Despite its growing adoption, the security vulnerabilities associated with this paradigm remain underexplored. In this work, we take the first step to propose BadBone, a stealthy and adaptive backdoor attack against prompt learning using bi-level optimization. Instead of backdooring the prompt learning process, we aim to compromise a backbone model such that only target downstream tasks employing prompt learning inherit the backdoor vulnerability. Extensive experiments on three different models and three datasets from various domains show that our targeted/untargeted backdoored models achieve high attack performance while maintaining utility on both pre-training and downstream tasks. Moreover, we evaluate our approach against six state-of-the-art model-level defenses, including Neural Cleanse, ABS, MNTD, NAD, CLP, and D-BR. The results demonstrate that these defenses are largely ineffective against our backdoored models and thus leave the effective defense as an important direction for future work. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_31246 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | BadBone: Backdoor Attacks Against Backbone Models in Visual Prompt Learning Yang, Ziqing Wen, Rui He, Xinlei Shen, Yun Backes, Michael Zhang, Yang Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Prompt learning is a new machine learning paradigm that has attracted ample attention due to its simplicity and proven efficacy. Despite its growing adoption, the security vulnerabilities associated with this paradigm remain underexplored. In this work, we take the first step to propose BadBone, a stealthy and adaptive backdoor attack against prompt learning using bi-level optimization. Instead of backdooring the prompt learning process, we aim to compromise a backbone model such that only target downstream tasks employing prompt learning inherit the backdoor vulnerability. Extensive experiments on three different models and three datasets from various domains show that our targeted/untargeted backdoored models achieve high attack performance while maintaining utility on both pre-training and downstream tasks. Moreover, we evaluate our approach against six state-of-the-art model-level defenses, including Neural Cleanse, ABS, MNTD, NAD, CLP, and D-BR. The results demonstrate that these defenses are largely ineffective against our backdoored models and thus leave the effective defense as an important direction for future work. |
| title | BadBone: Backdoor Attacks Against Backbone Models in Visual Prompt Learning |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.31246 |