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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00363 |
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| _version_ | 1866911735045160960 |
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| author | Mercier, Antoine Lopez-Wild, Josiah Spiegel, Elijah |
| author_facet | Mercier, Antoine Lopez-Wild, Josiah Spiegel, Elijah |
| contents | The task of inductive logic is to develop a formal framework to analyze inductive reasoning. Historically this was accomplished by assigning probabilities to sentences of a logical language. Two natural criteria for such a system are: (i) the underlying language should be rich enough to express scientific hypotheses, and (ii) the probabilities should be, in some sense, accessible. The first criterion suggests that the language should at least contain the language of arithmetic, while the second suggests that probabilities should be computable. We show that these two criteria are in tension with one another. Various natural proposals for an inductive logic result in probabilities that are not arithmetically definable, much less computable. We isolate the assumptions responsible for this result, and search for a weaker inductive logic with more accessible probabilities. The most natural weakening results in probabilities that are arithmetically definable but still are not computable. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2606_00363 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | At the Edge of Putnam's Program: Limitative Results For Computable Inductive Logics Mercier, Antoine Lopez-Wild, Josiah Spiegel, Elijah Logic The task of inductive logic is to develop a formal framework to analyze inductive reasoning. Historically this was accomplished by assigning probabilities to sentences of a logical language. Two natural criteria for such a system are: (i) the underlying language should be rich enough to express scientific hypotheses, and (ii) the probabilities should be, in some sense, accessible. The first criterion suggests that the language should at least contain the language of arithmetic, while the second suggests that probabilities should be computable. We show that these two criteria are in tension with one another. Various natural proposals for an inductive logic result in probabilities that are not arithmetically definable, much less computable. We isolate the assumptions responsible for this result, and search for a weaker inductive logic with more accessible probabilities. The most natural weakening results in probabilities that are arithmetically definable but still are not computable. |
| title | At the Edge of Putnam's Program: Limitative Results For Computable Inductive Logics |
| topic | Logic |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00363 |