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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00654 |
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| _version_ | 1866913175778099200 |
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| author | Wang, He Feng, Jun Sun, Hong Zhang, Pengfei |
| author_facet | Wang, He Feng, Jun Sun, Hong Zhang, Pengfei |
| contents | Current backdoor attacks against LLMs are typically manipulated by the attacker and remain passive. In this paper, we introduce the \textbf{Proactive Availability Backdoor (PAB)}, a novel paradigm that shifts the attack vector from passive waiting to active social engineering. By weaponizing the inherent helpfulness of aligned LLMs, PAB proactively traps users into executing trigger-implanted queries by offering suggestions, achieving high aggressiveness, precision and stealthiness. To rigorously evaluate its threat in a real-life context, we introduce a dual-agent ecological simulation framework based on selected dimensions of the Five-Factor Model, and deploy PAB with few-shot prompts. Being validated on different models and domains, PAB performs remarkably and its effective attack success rate, which calculates the joint probability of attack incidence rate and attack success rate, goes to \textbf{73.1\%}. We also introduce \textbf{Anti-PAB}, a defense method tailored for PAB. Our findings reveal that the helpfulness of LLMs can be weaponized to compromise availability, exposing a serious hidden threat to LLMs users. We release all the scripts and datasets in the experiments at \texttt{https://anonymous.4open.science/r/PAB-ANONYMOUS/}. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2606_00654 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Invitation Trap: Proactive Availability Backdoor in LLMs via Conversational Induction Wang, He Feng, Jun Sun, Hong Zhang, Pengfei Cryptography and Security Current backdoor attacks against LLMs are typically manipulated by the attacker and remain passive. In this paper, we introduce the \textbf{Proactive Availability Backdoor (PAB)}, a novel paradigm that shifts the attack vector from passive waiting to active social engineering. By weaponizing the inherent helpfulness of aligned LLMs, PAB proactively traps users into executing trigger-implanted queries by offering suggestions, achieving high aggressiveness, precision and stealthiness. To rigorously evaluate its threat in a real-life context, we introduce a dual-agent ecological simulation framework based on selected dimensions of the Five-Factor Model, and deploy PAB with few-shot prompts. Being validated on different models and domains, PAB performs remarkably and its effective attack success rate, which calculates the joint probability of attack incidence rate and attack success rate, goes to \textbf{73.1\%}. We also introduce \textbf{Anti-PAB}, a defense method tailored for PAB. Our findings reveal that the helpfulness of LLMs can be weaponized to compromise availability, exposing a serious hidden threat to LLMs users. We release all the scripts and datasets in the experiments at \texttt{https://anonymous.4open.science/r/PAB-ANONYMOUS/}. |
| title | The Invitation Trap: Proactive Availability Backdoor in LLMs via Conversational Induction |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00654 |