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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00720 |
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| _version_ | 1866916070638485504 |
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| author | Wu, Fei Öz, Burak |
| author_facet | Wu, Fei Öz, Burak |
| contents | Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) on high-throughput blockchains can be captured through targeted search, where bots identify opportunities off-chain and submit route-committed transactions, or through probabilistic search, where bots submit repeated attempts that resolve opportunity discovery during on-chain execution. This distinction has direct implications for spam, blockspace consumption, and protocol fee revenue. We model how ordering granularity, fee floors, and opportunity-access shocks shape competition between these architectures. Using cyclic arbitrage data on Base from June 2025 to February 2026, we develop a trace-level classifier for search architectures and show that the resulting labels correspond to distinct execution behavior. We test the model across three episodes: Flashblocks selects against broad on-chain probabilistic scanners; token-launch opportunity shocks temporarily revive probabilistic search; and higher fee floors select against probabilistic bots whose opportunity flow cannot sustain repeated attempts. In our sample, probabilistic search accounts for only 23% of arbitrage activity but produces 95% of spam and consumes 20% of Base gas. After Base's configuration changes, protocol fee revenue shifts toward successful arbitrages and away from spam, probabilistic bots pay higher priority fees, and spam consumes a smaller share of blockspace. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2606_00720 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains Wu, Fei Öz, Burak Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) on high-throughput blockchains can be captured through targeted search, where bots identify opportunities off-chain and submit route-committed transactions, or through probabilistic search, where bots submit repeated attempts that resolve opportunity discovery during on-chain execution. This distinction has direct implications for spam, blockspace consumption, and protocol fee revenue. We model how ordering granularity, fee floors, and opportunity-access shocks shape competition between these architectures. Using cyclic arbitrage data on Base from June 2025 to February 2026, we develop a trace-level classifier for search architectures and show that the resulting labels correspond to distinct execution behavior. We test the model across three episodes: Flashblocks selects against broad on-chain probabilistic scanners; token-launch opportunity shocks temporarily revive probabilistic search; and higher fee floors select against probabilistic bots whose opportunity flow cannot sustain repeated attempts. In our sample, probabilistic search accounts for only 23% of arbitrage activity but produces 95% of spam and consumes 20% of Base gas. After Base's configuration changes, protocol fee revenue shifts toward successful arbitrages and away from spam, probabilistic bots pay higher priority fees, and spam consumes a smaller share of blockspace. |
| title | To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains |
| topic | Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00720 |