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Main Authors: Braverman, Mark, Liu, Jingyi, Xue, Eric, Zhou, Chenghan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00951
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author Braverman, Mark
Liu, Jingyi
Xue, Eric
Zhou, Chenghan
author_facet Braverman, Mark
Liu, Jingyi
Xue, Eric
Zhou, Chenghan
contents In this paper, we investigate the computational hardness of finding fractional allocations to unit-demand players using competitive equilibria from equal incomes (CEEI), where we allow a small constant error in players' response to market prices (also known as an approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser equilibrium). We show that assuming the $\mathbf{(\varepsilon,δ)}$-Generalized Circuits problem is PPAD-hard (the "PCP for PPAD" conjecture), finding an approximate HZ equilibrium is also PPAD-hard. This result provides additional motivation for trying to prove the PCP for PPAD conjecture as a tool for obtaining robust computational hardness results about markets. Further, we introduce a natural restriction on approximate HZ equilibria, where players' bundles may still only be approximately optimal given the prices, but may not contain positive-price items for which the player has zero utility. We show unconditionally that there exists a constant $ε$ such that finding a restricted $ε$-HZ equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2606_00951
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Hardness of Approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser Equilibria
Braverman, Mark
Liu, Jingyi
Xue, Eric
Zhou, Chenghan
Computer Science and Game Theory
Computational Complexity
In this paper, we investigate the computational hardness of finding fractional allocations to unit-demand players using competitive equilibria from equal incomes (CEEI), where we allow a small constant error in players' response to market prices (also known as an approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser equilibrium). We show that assuming the $\mathbf{(\varepsilon,δ)}$-Generalized Circuits problem is PPAD-hard (the "PCP for PPAD" conjecture), finding an approximate HZ equilibrium is also PPAD-hard. This result provides additional motivation for trying to prove the PCP for PPAD conjecture as a tool for obtaining robust computational hardness results about markets. Further, we introduce a natural restriction on approximate HZ equilibria, where players' bundles may still only be approximately optimal given the prices, but may not contain positive-price items for which the player has zero utility. We show unconditionally that there exists a constant $ε$ such that finding a restricted $ε$-HZ equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
title Hardness of Approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser Equilibria
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Computational Complexity
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00951