Self-Duality and Transfer in Voting Games
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913176810946560 |
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| author | Abe, Takaaki |
| author_facet | Abe, Takaaki |
| contents | This paper studies the role of self-duality in the axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik power index. We show that, when self-duality is imposed, the transfer axiom can be weakened to a restricted version requiring transfer only among voting games with no veto player. This result shows that self-duality can partially substitute for the transfer axiom. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2606_01018 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Self-Duality and Transfer in Voting Games Abe, Takaaki Theoretical Economics 91A12 This paper studies the role of self-duality in the axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik power index. We show that, when self-duality is imposed, the transfer axiom can be weakened to a restricted version requiring transfer only among voting games with no veto player. This result shows that self-duality can partially substitute for the transfer axiom. |
| title | Self-Duality and Transfer in Voting Games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics 91A12 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.01018 |