Cover Image

Cheap Talk in Bilateral Trade

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Tucker-Foltz, Jamie, Zeckhauser, Richard
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences
by: Tucker-Foltz, Jamie, et al.
Published: (2022)

Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trade with a Broker
by: Hajiaghayi, Ilya, et al.
Published: (2024)

Explainable Information Design
by: Chen, Yiling, et al.
Published: (2025)

Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
by: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Published: (2024)

Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness
by: Finster, Simon, et al.
Published: (2026)

A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade
by: Hartline, Jason, et al.
Published: (2025)

Axioms for Top Trading Cycles in Multi-Object Reallocation
by: Coreno, Jacob, et al.
Published: (2024)

Training Language Models for Bilateral Trade with Private Information
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2026)

Distributed Interview Selection for Stable Matching in Large Random Markets
by: Cole, Richard, et al.
Published: (2025)

Proportional Response Dynamics in Gross Substitutes Markets
by: Cheung, Yun Kuen, et al.
Published: (2025)

Complexity of Stability in Trading Networks
by: Fleiner, Tamás, et al.
Published: (2018)

Will AI Trade? A Computational Inversion of the No-Trade Theorem
by: Li, Hanyu, et al.
Published: (2025)

A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2026)

Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness
by: Sandomirskiy, Fedor, et al.
Published: (2026)

Anonymous Pricing in Large Markets
by: Jin, Yaonan, et al.
Published: (2026)

How damaging is zero-sum thinking to an agent's interests when the world is positive-sum?
by: Heap, Shaun Hargreaves, et al.
Published: (2026)

Bayesian Persuasion with a Risk-Conscious Receiver
by: Chen, Yujing
Published: (2026)

Existence of Fair Resolute Voting Rules
by: Dhar, Manik, et al.
Published: (2026)

Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof
by: Hart, Sergiu, et al.
Published: (2026)

The Welfare Gap of Strategic Storage: Universal Bounds and Price Non-Linearity
by: Jiang, Zhile, et al.
Published: (2026)

Screening for Choice Sets
by: Gan, Tan, et al.
Published: (2026)

Testing Decision Makers without Counterfactuals
by: Babichenko, Yakov
Published: (2026)

Pricing with a Hidden Sample
by: Tang, Zhihao Gavin, et al.
Published: (2026)

Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
by: Hartline, Jason
Published: (2026)

The Architecture of Illusion: Network Opacity and Strategic Escalation
by: Ebrahimi, Raman, et al.
Published: (2026)

Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions
by: Du, Zhicheng, et al.
Published: (2026)

Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive Valuations
by: Mackenzie, Simon, et al.
Published: (2026)

Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation
by: Rudov, Kirill, et al.
Published: (2026)

Stronger core results with multidimensional prices
by: Braverman, Mark, et al.
Published: (2026)

Stabilizing Welfare-Maximizing Decisions via Endogenous Transfers
by: Kavner, Joshua
Published: (2026)

The Impossibility of Strategyproof Rank Aggregation
by: Eberl, Manuel, et al.
Published: (2026)

The Computational Intractability of Not Worst Responding
by: Ahunbay, Mete Şeref, et al.
Published: (2026)

A Theory of Network Games Part 1: Utility Representations
by: Root, Joseph, et al.
Published: (2026)

Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information
by: Tang, Zhihao Gavin, et al.
Published: (2026)

Smart Lotteries in School Choice: Ex-ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-post Stability
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2026)

Simple and Robust Quality Disclosure: The Power of Quantile Partition
by: Agrawal, Shipra, et al.
Published: (2026)

The Domain of RSD Characterization by Efficiency, Symmetry, and Strategy-Proofness
by: Zaquen, Maor Ben, et al.
Published: (2026)

Irreversible Failure Reverses the Value of Information
by: Kirk, Nicholas H.
Published: (2026)

Convergence rates of random-order best-response dynamics in public good games on networks
by: Misiak, Wojciech, et al.
Published: (2026)

Justifiable Priority Violations
by: Ortega, Josué, et al.
Published: (2026)