Regulating EV Charging Markets for Fairness: Incentives for Pricing and Capacity Decisions
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866910278580436992 |
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| author | Wang, Ruiting Hu, Kita Yu, Yitong Moura, Scott |
| author_facet | Wang, Ruiting Hu, Kita Yu, Yitong Moura, Scott |
| contents | The transition to electric mobility calls for charging infrastructure that is both efficient and socially equitable. This paper examines fairness in electric vehicle (EV) charging station pricing and capacity through a game-theoretic perspective. We model a non-cooperative market in which competing charging service providers set prices and capacities while customers choose stations based on generalized cost, leading to a market equilibrium. We then benchmark this decentralized outcome against an idealized planner solution that jointly optimizes efficiency and equity. To align market outcomes with socially desirable goals, we design targeted incentives that guide operators toward more fair charger placement. Case studies demonstrate that unregulated competition tends to exacerbate disparities in charger access across demographic groups, whereas carefully calibrated incentives can reduce inequities without significant efficiency loss. The framework provides insights for policymakers on reconciling free-market dynamics with the broader societal goals of fairness in electrified mobility systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2606_01266 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Regulating EV Charging Markets for Fairness: Incentives for Pricing and Capacity Decisions Wang, Ruiting Hu, Kita Yu, Yitong Moura, Scott Systems and Control The transition to electric mobility calls for charging infrastructure that is both efficient and socially equitable. This paper examines fairness in electric vehicle (EV) charging station pricing and capacity through a game-theoretic perspective. We model a non-cooperative market in which competing charging service providers set prices and capacities while customers choose stations based on generalized cost, leading to a market equilibrium. We then benchmark this decentralized outcome against an idealized planner solution that jointly optimizes efficiency and equity. To align market outcomes with socially desirable goals, we design targeted incentives that guide operators toward more fair charger placement. Case studies demonstrate that unregulated competition tends to exacerbate disparities in charger access across demographic groups, whereas carefully calibrated incentives can reduce inequities without significant efficiency loss. The framework provides insights for policymakers on reconciling free-market dynamics with the broader societal goals of fairness in electrified mobility systems. |
| title | Regulating EV Charging Markets for Fairness: Incentives for Pricing and Capacity Decisions |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.01266 |