Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies
Fuente:
Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT)
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Published: |
International Labour Organization
2017
|
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1874525255033159681 |
|---|---|
| author | Tony Dobbins Tony Dundon Niall Cullinane Eugene Hickland Jimmy Donaghey |
| author_facet | Tony Dobbins Tony Dundon Niall Cullinane Eugene Hickland Jimmy Donaghey Tony Dobbins Tony Dundon Niall Cullinane Eugene Hickland Jimmy Donaghey |
| contents | Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies Tony Dobbins Tony Dundon Niall Cullinane Eugene Hickland Jimmy Donaghey This article analyses the impact of information and consultation regulations – specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive – on worker participation or “employee voice” in liberal market economies (LMEs), providing both empirical and theoretical insights to complement existing research on the Directive. Using game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework, and empirical data from 16 case studies, the authors explain why national legislation implementing the Directive is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual‐gains cooperation in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Three theoretical explanatory propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of information and consultation regulations in LMEs. 10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x publication.journalArticle |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | ilo_995219470902676 |
| institution | Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | International Labour Organization |
| spellingShingle | Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies Tony Dobbins Tony Dundon Niall Cullinane Eugene Hickland Jimmy Donaghey Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies Tony Dobbins Tony Dundon Niall Cullinane Eugene Hickland Jimmy Donaghey This article analyses the impact of information and consultation regulations – specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive – on worker participation or “employee voice” in liberal market economies (LMEs), providing both empirical and theoretical insights to complement existing research on the Directive. Using game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework, and empirical data from 16 case studies, the authors explain why national legislation implementing the Directive is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual‐gains cooperation in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Three theoretical explanatory propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of information and consultation regulations in LMEs. 10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x publication.journalArticle |
| title | Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies |
| url | https://researchrepository.ilo.org/esploro/outputs/journalArticle/Employment-regulation-game-theory-and-weak/995219470902676 |