The design of active labour market policies: building in effective incentives

Fuente: Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT)
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1. Verfasser: Bart Cockx
Format: Artículo científico
Veröffentlicht: International Labour Organization 2000
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author Bart Cockx
author_facet Bart Cockx
Bart Cockx
contents The design of active labour market policies: building in effective incentives Bart Cockx Reviews four types of explanation for unemployment persistence and discusses the implications for designing effective labour market policies, notably the need to avoid perverse incentives. Examines two programmes in Belgium: a work experience programme for welfare recipients and a vocational training programme for the unemployed. publication.journalArticle
format Artículo científico
id ilo_995274563402676
institution Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT)
publishDate 2000
publisher International Labour Organization
spellingShingle The design of active labour market policies: building in effective incentives
Bart Cockx
The design of active labour market policies: building in effective incentives Bart Cockx Reviews four types of explanation for unemployment persistence and discusses the implications for designing effective labour market policies, notably the need to avoid perverse incentives. Examines two programmes in Belgium: a work experience programme for welfare recipients and a vocational training programme for the unemployed. publication.journalArticle
title The design of active labour market policies: building in effective incentives
url https://researchrepository.ilo.org/esploro/outputs/journalArticle/The-design-of-active-labour-market/995274563402676