Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition?

Fuente: Redalyc
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ludovic Julien
Format: Artículo científico
Language:en
Published: Universidad de Antioquia 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1876488789903278080
author Ludovic Julien
author_facet Ludovic Julien
contents Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition? Ludovic Julien Olivier Musy Aurélien Saïdi Economía y Finanzas linear economy follower's output index Leader's markup discount ratio generalized Stackelberg competition In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocity of convergence as the number of firms increases. The convergence is faster when reallocating firms from the most to the less populated cohort until equalizing the size of all cohorts. 2011 artículo científico 0120-2596 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=155222750001 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=1552 Lecturas de Economía application/pdf Universidad de Antioquia Lecturas de Economía (Colombia) Num.75
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_155222750001
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2011
publisher Universidad de Antioquia
spellingShingle Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition?
Ludovic Julien
Economía y Finanzas
linear economy
follower's output index
Leader's markup discount ratio
generalized Stackelberg competition
Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition? Ludovic Julien Olivier Musy Aurélien Saïdi Economía y Finanzas linear economy follower's output index Leader's markup discount ratio generalized Stackelberg competition In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocity of convergence as the number of firms increases. The convergence is faster when reallocating firms from the most to the less populated cohort until equalizing the size of all cohorts. 2011 artículo científico 0120-2596 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=155222750001 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=1552 Lecturas de Economía application/pdf Universidad de Antioquia Lecturas de Economía (Colombia) Num.75
title Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition?
topic Economía y Finanzas
linear economy
follower's output index
Leader's markup discount ratio
generalized Stackelberg competition
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=155222750001