FOREIGN MONOPOLY AND SELF-ENFORCING TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Fundación SEPI
2009
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| author | M. DOLORES ALEPUZ |
| author_facet | M. DOLORES ALEPUZ |
| contents | FOREIGN MONOPOLY AND SELF-ENFORCING TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES M. DOLORES ALEPUZ SANTIAGO J. RUBIO Economía y Finanzas Self rent integrated markets shifting hypothesis enforcing tariff agreements This paper studies the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market. The tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each importer decides whether or not to sign the agreement, and in the second stage the signatories choose cooperatively their tariffs whereas the non-signatories and the monopoly act in a non-cooperative way. Our findings show that the agreement consists of three countries regardless of whether the monopolist chooses the quantity or the price and the number of importers, provided that the parties to the agreement act as a leader in the second stage of the game. 2009 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17312887002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.1 Vol.XXXIII |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_17312887002 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Fundación SEPI |
| spellingShingle | FOREIGN MONOPOLY AND SELF-ENFORCING TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES M. DOLORES ALEPUZ Economía y Finanzas Self rent integrated markets shifting hypothesis enforcing tariff agreements FOREIGN MONOPOLY AND SELF-ENFORCING TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES M. DOLORES ALEPUZ SANTIAGO J. RUBIO Economía y Finanzas Self rent integrated markets shifting hypothesis enforcing tariff agreements This paper studies the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market. The tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each importer decides whether or not to sign the agreement, and in the second stage the signatories choose cooperatively their tariffs whereas the non-signatories and the monopoly act in a non-cooperative way. Our findings show that the agreement consists of three countries regardless of whether the monopolist chooses the quantity or the price and the number of importers, provided that the parties to the agreement act as a leader in the second stage of the game. 2009 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17312887002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.1 Vol.XXXIII |
| title | FOREIGN MONOPOLY AND SELF-ENFORCING TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas Self rent integrated markets shifting hypothesis enforcing tariff agreements |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17312887002 |