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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Fundación SEPI
2003
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| Online Access: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17327101 |
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| _version_ | 1866555988999405568 |
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| author | Pau Olivella |
| author_facet | Pau Olivella |
| contents | Cost reducing strategies Pau Olivella Maite Pastor Economía y Finanzas � cient suppliers sharing suppliers vertical restraints asymmetric information We consider an industry where one of the manufacturers and its supplier(S) have engaged in some specific investment in the past. We assume thatthis has three consequences: S has lower expected production costs than othersuppliers, supplier-switching costs exist, and the manufacturer may limit itsrivals access to S. In the case when only S knows its true production costs,we compare alternative mechanisms to induce S to reveal its private information,namely, paying informational rents, using threats of switching suppliers,and most importantly, permitting S to serve other firms. We prove that thepresence of asymmetric information mitigates the manufacturers incentivesto engage in vertical restraints. We derive several policy implications fromthis result. 2003 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17327101 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.1 Vol.XXVII |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_17327101 |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | Fundación SEPI |
| spellingShingle | Cost reducing strategies Pau Olivella Economía y Finanzas � cient suppliers sharing suppliers vertical restraints asymmetric information Cost reducing strategies Pau Olivella Maite Pastor Economía y Finanzas � cient suppliers sharing suppliers vertical restraints asymmetric information We consider an industry where one of the manufacturers and its supplier(S) have engaged in some specific investment in the past. We assume thatthis has three consequences: S has lower expected production costs than othersuppliers, supplier-switching costs exist, and the manufacturer may limit itsrivals access to S. In the case when only S knows its true production costs,we compare alternative mechanisms to induce S to reveal its private information,namely, paying informational rents, using threats of switching suppliers,and most importantly, permitting S to serve other firms. We prove that thepresence of asymmetric information mitigates the manufacturers incentivesto engage in vertical restraints. We derive several policy implications fromthis result. 2003 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17327101 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.1 Vol.XXVII |
| title | Cost reducing strategies |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas � cient suppliers sharing suppliers vertical restraints asymmetric information |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17327101 |