Unilateral commitments to disclose know-how in research joint ventures
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Redalyc
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| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Lenguaje: | en |
| Publicado: |
Fundación SEPI
2003
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| _version_ | 1876435358558715904 |
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| author | Joel Sandonís |
| author_facet | Joel Sandonís |
| contents | Unilateral commitments to disclose know-how in research joint ventures Joel Sandonís Economía y Finanzas how know moral hazard unilateral commitments Research joint ventures In this paper, the use of unilateral commitments by the partners participatingin a Research Joint Venture (RJV) is explained as part of the firms attemptto select the e��cient equilibrium in cases where multiple equilibria exist. In aframework including asymmetric information and uncertainty we show thatunilateral commitment by a firm to disclose its own know-how to the venturecan be e��ective in inducing cooperative behavior by the partners only if theyhave complementary technologies, their absorptive capacity is not very highand only for intermediate innovation values. Complementarity between thepartners also increases stability in RJVs. 2003 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17327107 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.1 Vol.XXVII |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_17327107 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | Fundación SEPI |
| spellingShingle | Unilateral commitments to disclose know-how in research joint ventures Joel Sandonís Economía y Finanzas how know moral hazard unilateral commitments Research joint ventures Unilateral commitments to disclose know-how in research joint ventures Joel Sandonís Economía y Finanzas how know moral hazard unilateral commitments Research joint ventures In this paper, the use of unilateral commitments by the partners participatingin a Research Joint Venture (RJV) is explained as part of the firms attemptto select the e��cient equilibrium in cases where multiple equilibria exist. In aframework including asymmetric information and uncertainty we show thatunilateral commitment by a firm to disclose its own know-how to the venturecan be e��ective in inducing cooperative behavior by the partners only if theyhave complementary technologies, their absorptive capacity is not very highand only for intermediate innovation values. Complementarity between thepartners also increases stability in RJVs. 2003 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17327107 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.1 Vol.XXVII |
| title | Unilateral commitments to disclose know-how in research joint ventures |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas how know moral hazard unilateral commitments Research joint ventures |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17327107 |