On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion
Fuente:
Redalyc
Salvato in:
| Autore principale: | |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Artículo científico |
| Lingua: | en |
| Pubblicazione: |
Fundación SEPI
2008
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1876465194236903424 |
|---|---|
| author | Marc Escrihuela-Villar |
| author_facet | Marc Escrihuela-Villar |
| contents | On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion Marc Escrihuela-Villar Economía y Finanzas Collusion partial cartels trigger strategies optimal punishment We analyze how the size of a cartel affects the possibility to sustain a collusive agreement. We develop a multi-period oligopoly model with homogeneous, quantity-setting firms, a subset of which are assumed to collude, while the remaining (fringe) firms choose their output levels noncooperatively. We show that, in our model, collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. The implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel are analyzed. We obtain that a firm is only willing to collude when otherwise collusion cannot be sustained. 2008 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17332303 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.3 Vol.XXXII |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_17332303 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publisher | Fundación SEPI |
| spellingShingle | On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion Marc Escrihuela-Villar Economía y Finanzas Collusion partial cartels trigger strategies optimal punishment On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion Marc Escrihuela-Villar Economía y Finanzas Collusion partial cartels trigger strategies optimal punishment We analyze how the size of a cartel affects the possibility to sustain a collusive agreement. We develop a multi-period oligopoly model with homogeneous, quantity-setting firms, a subset of which are assumed to collude, while the remaining (fringe) firms choose their output levels noncooperatively. We show that, in our model, collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. The implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel are analyzed. We obtain that a firm is only willing to collude when otherwise collusion cannot be sustained. 2008 artículo científico 0210-1521 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17332303 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=173 Investigaciones Económicas application/pdf Fundación SEPI Investigaciones Económicas (España) Num.3 Vol.XXXII |
| title | On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas Collusion partial cartels trigger strategies optimal punishment |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17332303 |