Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal

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Main Author: Guadalupe Reinoso
Format: Artículo científico
Language:en
Published: Universidad del Valle 2022
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author Guadalupe Reinoso
author_facet Guadalupe Reinoso
contents Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal Guadalupe Reinoso Filosofía Quietism Neopyrrhonism Disagreements Metaphilosophy Philosophical Arguments R. Fogelin (2002 1976; 1992 1981; 1994) was the first one to speak about “Neopyrrhonism” to link Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus. To him, Pyrrhonism “combines philosophical scepticism with scepticism about philosophy, that is, to have doubts about philosophy on the basis of philosophical arguments” (1994, p. 3). Following this interpretation, Neopyrrhonism can be understood as a kind of scepticism that cancels philosophy using self-destructive arguments (peritrope). Both Sextus -with his proposal of suspension of judgment- and Wittgenstein -with his idea of the dissolution of philosophical problems- are representatives of quietism. Neopyrrhonism as quietism can be conceived of as a therapeutic proposal mainly based on not postulating an argumentative-constructive philosophical theory. Against this perspective, I propose interpreting Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy, from which a performative proposal emerges. In this approach, Neopyrrhonism is an open-ended inquiry that implies the ability of using different philosophical argumentative strategies in a performative sense to encourage a new way of exercising philosophy. 2022 artículo científico 0120-4688 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=209070956002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/209070956002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/movil 10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i54.11935 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=2090 Praxis Filosófica application/pdf Universidad del Valle Praxis Filosófica (Colombia) Num.54
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_209070956002
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2022
publisher Universidad del Valle
spellingShingle Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal
Guadalupe Reinoso
Filosofía
Quietism
Neopyrrhonism
Disagreements
Metaphilosophy
Philosophical Arguments
Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal Guadalupe Reinoso Filosofía Quietism Neopyrrhonism Disagreements Metaphilosophy Philosophical Arguments R. Fogelin (2002 1976; 1992 1981; 1994) was the first one to speak about “Neopyrrhonism” to link Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus. To him, Pyrrhonism “combines philosophical scepticism with scepticism about philosophy, that is, to have doubts about philosophy on the basis of philosophical arguments” (1994, p. 3). Following this interpretation, Neopyrrhonism can be understood as a kind of scepticism that cancels philosophy using self-destructive arguments (peritrope). Both Sextus -with his proposal of suspension of judgment- and Wittgenstein -with his idea of the dissolution of philosophical problems- are representatives of quietism. Neopyrrhonism as quietism can be conceived of as a therapeutic proposal mainly based on not postulating an argumentative-constructive philosophical theory. Against this perspective, I propose interpreting Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy, from which a performative proposal emerges. In this approach, Neopyrrhonism is an open-ended inquiry that implies the ability of using different philosophical argumentative strategies in a performative sense to encourage a new way of exercising philosophy. 2022 artículo científico 0120-4688 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=209070956002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/209070956002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/movil 10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i54.11935 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=2090 Praxis Filosófica application/pdf Universidad del Valle Praxis Filosófica (Colombia) Num.54
title Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal
topic Filosofía
Quietism
Neopyrrhonism
Disagreements
Metaphilosophy
Philosophical Arguments
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=209070956002
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/html/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/209070956002.epub
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2090/209070956002/movil