Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | pt |
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Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
2010
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| author | André Marenco |
| author_facet | André Marenco |
| contents | Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada André Marenco Sociología transparency election finance Electoral legislation Democracies have adopted different legislative models to regulate election finance: maximum limits to contributions, bans on donations by companies that provide public services or operate government concessions, and disclosure of private donations and public funds to cover campaign expenditures. The current study's underlying hypothesis is that there is no association between the legislation's rigor and improvement in indicators of institutional transparency. The study analyzes the extent to which different types of institutional formats like democracy, presidentialism, type of electoral slate, and size of voting districts, as well as economic development variables, can explain the failure of electoral legislation to produce transparency in election finance. 2010 artículo científico 0011-5258 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817697002 pt http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=218 Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais application/pdf Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais (Brasil) Num.4 Vol.53 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_21817697002 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | pt |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro |
| spellingShingle | Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada André Marenco Sociología transparency election finance Electoral legislation Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada André Marenco Sociología transparency election finance Electoral legislation Democracies have adopted different legislative models to regulate election finance: maximum limits to contributions, bans on donations by companies that provide public services or operate government concessions, and disclosure of private donations and public funds to cover campaign expenditures. The current study's underlying hypothesis is that there is no association between the legislation's rigor and improvement in indicators of institutional transparency. The study analyzes the extent to which different types of institutional formats like democracy, presidentialism, type of electoral slate, and size of voting districts, as well as economic development variables, can explain the failure of electoral legislation to produce transparency in election finance. 2010 artículo científico 0011-5258 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817697002 pt http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=218 Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais application/pdf Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais (Brasil) Num.4 Vol.53 |
| title | Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada |
| topic | Sociología transparency election finance Electoral legislation |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817697002 |