Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil

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1. Verfasser: Bernardo Mueller
Format: Artículo científico
Sprache:en
Veröffentlicht: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2002
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author Bernardo Mueller
author_facet Bernardo Mueller
contents Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil Bernardo Mueller Carlos Pereira Sociología Brazil executive coalition legislative budgetary process In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget.Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments arecompatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive aswell as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may notauthorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also theexecutive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really beappropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability ofresources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not onlyrestrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at lowcosts its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the BrazilianPresident rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests byexecuting their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally,punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments. 2002 artículo científico 0011-5258 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21845204 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=218 Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais application/pdf Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais (Brasil) Num.2 Vol.45
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_21845204
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2002
publisher Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
spellingShingle Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
Bernardo Mueller
Sociología
Brazil
executive
coalition
legislative
budgetary process
Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil Bernardo Mueller Carlos Pereira Sociología Brazil executive coalition legislative budgetary process In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget.Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments arecompatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive aswell as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may notauthorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also theexecutive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really beappropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability ofresources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not onlyrestrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at lowcosts its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the BrazilianPresident rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests byexecuting their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally,punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments. 2002 artículo científico 0011-5258 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21845204 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=218 Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais application/pdf Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais (Brasil) Num.2 Vol.45
title Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
topic Sociología
Brazil
executive
coalition
legislative
budgetary process
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21845204