WAGE BARGAINING AND PARTIAL OWNERSHIP
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Langue: | en |
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Universidad de Chile
2010
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| author | Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz |
| author_facet | Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz |
| contents | WAGE BARGAINING AND PARTIAL OWNERSHIP Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz María Luz Campo Economía y Finanzas Wage Bargaining Partial Ownership Heterogeneous Goods This paper analyzes wage negotiation between firms and unions when crossparticipation exists at ownership level. We consider two shareholders and two firms: one firm is jointly owned by the two shareholders and the other is owned by a single shareholder. Labor is unionized and the firms produce substitute products. We show that partial ownership increases the bargaining strength of the firm owned by a single shareholder; although this firm pays lower wages produces less output than the other firm. Compared with the case in which each firm is owned by a single shareholder, partial ownership reduces the wage paid by firms, the output of industry and therefore employment. Whether firms obtain greater or lower profit depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes. In fact, we obtain the surprising result that when the degree to which goods are substitutes is low enough, the firm that is owned by a single shareholder makes more profit than the other firm. 2010 artículo científico 0304-2758 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22115567002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=221 Estudios de Economía application/pdf Universidad de Chile Estudios de Economía (Chile) Num.1 Vol.37 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_22115567002 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Universidad de Chile |
| spellingShingle | WAGE BARGAINING AND PARTIAL OWNERSHIP Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz Economía y Finanzas Wage Bargaining Partial Ownership Heterogeneous Goods WAGE BARGAINING AND PARTIAL OWNERSHIP Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz María Luz Campo Economía y Finanzas Wage Bargaining Partial Ownership Heterogeneous Goods This paper analyzes wage negotiation between firms and unions when crossparticipation exists at ownership level. We consider two shareholders and two firms: one firm is jointly owned by the two shareholders and the other is owned by a single shareholder. Labor is unionized and the firms produce substitute products. We show that partial ownership increases the bargaining strength of the firm owned by a single shareholder; although this firm pays lower wages produces less output than the other firm. Compared with the case in which each firm is owned by a single shareholder, partial ownership reduces the wage paid by firms, the output of industry and therefore employment. Whether firms obtain greater or lower profit depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes. In fact, we obtain the surprising result that when the degree to which goods are substitutes is low enough, the firm that is owned by a single shareholder makes more profit than the other firm. 2010 artículo científico 0304-2758 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22115567002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=221 Estudios de Economía application/pdf Universidad de Chile Estudios de Economía (Chile) Num.1 Vol.37 |
| title | WAGE BARGAINING AND PARTIAL OWNERSHIP |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas Wage Bargaining Partial Ownership Heterogeneous Goods |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22115567002 |