Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation

Fuente: Redalyc
Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale: Hamid Hamoudi
Natura: Artículo científico
Lingua:en
Pubblicazione: Universidad de Chile 2017
Soggetti:
Accesso online:
Tags: Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
_version_ 1876488437024948224
author Hamid Hamoudi
author_facet Hamid Hamoudi
contents Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation Hamid Hamoudi Isabel Rodríguez Marcos Sanz Martín-Bustamante Economía y Finanzas Zoning welfare function industrial policy spatial competition equilibrium results This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator. 2017 artículo científico 0304-2758 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22152910002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=221 Estudios de Economía application/pdf Universidad de Chile Estudios de Economía (Chile) Num.1 Vol.44
format Artículo científico
id redalyc_22152910002
institution Redalyc
language en
publishDate 2017
publisher Universidad de Chile
spellingShingle Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
Hamid Hamoudi
Economía y Finanzas
Zoning
welfare function
industrial policy
spatial competition
equilibrium results
Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation Hamid Hamoudi Isabel Rodríguez Marcos Sanz Martín-Bustamante Economía y Finanzas Zoning welfare function industrial policy spatial competition equilibrium results This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator. 2017 artículo científico 0304-2758 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22152910002 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=221 Estudios de Economía application/pdf Universidad de Chile Estudios de Economía (Chile) Num.1 Vol.44
title Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation
topic Economía y Finanzas
Zoning
welfare function
industrial policy
spatial competition
equilibrium results
url https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22152910002