A MODEL OF DESERTION. FROM A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY PERSPECTIVE
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Language: | en |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia
2017
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| _version_ | 1876445185400897536 |
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| author | Maria del Pilar Castillo |
| author_facet | Maria del Pilar Castillo |
| contents | A MODEL OF DESERTION. FROM A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY PERSPECTIVE Maria del Pilar Castillo Giácomo Balbinotto N. Economía y Finanzas Principal contracts game theory agent theory This article studies the nature of the trade-off between incentives and enforcement mechanisms that an Armed Illegal Organization (AIO)'s leadership, which is the principal, offers to its operatives, who act as agents. This principal-agent model focuses on both the expected benefits and costs for those who decide to stay or defect from the armed organization, in an uncertain context in which desertion is encouraged by an external agent who is providing incentives aimed at fostering operatives’ individual desertion. Given a parameterization of the model, we find the optimal transfer system using the constrained minimization routine fmincon in MATLAB’s optimizations toolbox. Once we obtain a numerical version of the contract, we use the computational tool to simulate the behavior of agents who are facing the probability of being punished and how this could encourage agents to not make any effort. 2017 artículo científico 0121-4772 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=282146950002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/282146950002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/movil en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=2821 Cuadernos de Economía application/pdf Universidad Nacional de Colombia Cuadernos de Economía (Colombia) Num.70 Vol.XXXVI |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_282146950002 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
| spellingShingle | A MODEL OF DESERTION. FROM A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY PERSPECTIVE Maria del Pilar Castillo Economía y Finanzas Principal contracts game theory agent theory A MODEL OF DESERTION. FROM A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY PERSPECTIVE Maria del Pilar Castillo Giácomo Balbinotto N. Economía y Finanzas Principal contracts game theory agent theory This article studies the nature of the trade-off between incentives and enforcement mechanisms that an Armed Illegal Organization (AIO)'s leadership, which is the principal, offers to its operatives, who act as agents. This principal-agent model focuses on both the expected benefits and costs for those who decide to stay or defect from the armed organization, in an uncertain context in which desertion is encouraged by an external agent who is providing incentives aimed at fostering operatives’ individual desertion. Given a parameterization of the model, we find the optimal transfer system using the constrained minimization routine fmincon in MATLAB’s optimizations toolbox. Once we obtain a numerical version of the contract, we use the computational tool to simulate the behavior of agents who are facing the probability of being punished and how this could encourage agents to not make any effort. 2017 artículo científico 0121-4772 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=282146950002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/282146950002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/movil en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=2821 Cuadernos de Economía application/pdf Universidad Nacional de Colombia Cuadernos de Economía (Colombia) Num.70 Vol.XXXVI |
| title | A MODEL OF DESERTION. FROM A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY PERSPECTIVE |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas Principal contracts game theory agent theory |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=282146950002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/282146950002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282146950002/movil |