An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions
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| Format: | Artículo científico |
| Langue: | en |
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Universidad Panamericana
2023
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| _version_ | 1876471917690486784 |
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| author | Ignacio Vilaró |
| author_facet | Ignacio Vilaró |
| contents | An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions Ignacio Vilaró Filosofía Austin contextualism skeptical paradox epistemic closure illocutionary force According to epistemic contextualism, the truth value of a knowledge ascription sentence varies in relation to the epistemic standard in play at its context of use. Contextualists promise a relatively conservative (dis)solution of the skeptical paradox that threatens to destroy our alleged everyday knowledge, based on our apparent inability to discard some exotic possibilities of error. The origins of the contextualist position have been traced back to some passages of Austin’s “Other Minds.” However, it is at best dubious whether the alternative there explored is indeed contextualist. Austin seems to be proposing a much more radical position, one still ignored in the literature. This paper aims to develop an Austinian approach to knowledge attributions. I show how we could use the Austinian account to solve this skeptical paradox. I also respond to some important objections to this view. 2023 artículo científico 0188-6649 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=323075166002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/323075166002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/movil 10.21555/top.v650.2061 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3230 Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía application/pdf Universidad Panamericana Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía (México) Num.65 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_323075166002 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Universidad Panamericana |
| spellingShingle | An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions Ignacio Vilaró Filosofía Austin contextualism skeptical paradox epistemic closure illocutionary force An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions Ignacio Vilaró Filosofía Austin contextualism skeptical paradox epistemic closure illocutionary force According to epistemic contextualism, the truth value of a knowledge ascription sentence varies in relation to the epistemic standard in play at its context of use. Contextualists promise a relatively conservative (dis)solution of the skeptical paradox that threatens to destroy our alleged everyday knowledge, based on our apparent inability to discard some exotic possibilities of error. The origins of the contextualist position have been traced back to some passages of Austin’s “Other Minds.” However, it is at best dubious whether the alternative there explored is indeed contextualist. Austin seems to be proposing a much more radical position, one still ignored in the literature. This paper aims to develop an Austinian approach to knowledge attributions. I show how we could use the Austinian account to solve this skeptical paradox. I also respond to some important objections to this view. 2023 artículo científico 0188-6649 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=323075166002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/323075166002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/movil 10.21555/top.v650.2061 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3230 Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía application/pdf Universidad Panamericana Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía (México) Num.65 |
| title | An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions |
| topic | Filosofía Austin contextualism skeptical paradox epistemic closure illocutionary force |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=323075166002 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/323075166002.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3230/323075166002/movil |