An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
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| Natura: | Artículo científico |
| Lingua: | en |
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Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
2004
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| _version_ | 1876462181710561280 |
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| author | Laura Sour |
| author_facet | Laura Sour |
| contents | An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity Laura Sour Economía y Finanzas evasion honesty social norms moral values tax compliance Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed taxcompliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this modelboth moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explainfour pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditionalmodel, namely i) high level of tax compliance; ii) honest responses whenindividuals pay their taxes, even in the presence of high incentives fortax evasion; iii) the level of evasion increases with the tax rate; and iv)individuals are more likely to evade when they realize that there is alarge number of evaders in society. 2004 artículo científico 1665-2045 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32313103 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323 Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época application/pdf Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XIII |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_32313103 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publisher | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. |
| spellingShingle | An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity Laura Sour Economía y Finanzas evasion honesty social norms moral values tax compliance An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity Laura Sour Economía y Finanzas evasion honesty social norms moral values tax compliance Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed taxcompliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this modelboth moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explainfour pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditionalmodel, namely i) high level of tax compliance; ii) honest responses whenindividuals pay their taxes, even in the presence of high incentives fortax evasion; iii) the level of evasion increases with the tax rate; and iv)individuals are more likely to evade when they realize that there is alarge number of evaders in society. 2004 artículo científico 1665-2045 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32313103 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323 Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época application/pdf Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XIII |
| title | An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas evasion honesty social norms moral values tax compliance |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32313103 |