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| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Lenguaje: | en |
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Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
2005
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32314102 |
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| _version_ | 1866817061847564288 |
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| author | Alfonso Mendieta |
| author_facet | Alfonso Mendieta |
| contents | Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried? Alfonso Mendieta Economía y Finanzas antidumping tacit collusion price competition repeated interaction Administered protection is not the only outcome of antidumpingmeasures. This paper suggests a basic model of repeated interactionbetween a domestic and a foreign firm. Competing in prices in the importingmarket, antidumping action serves as the means to enforce andsustain tacit collusion between the firms. The main result is that pricedistortions by antidumping policy are a departure point for the achievementof the collusive outcome. Discount factors of future profits are alteredrelative to those observed under free trade, delaying domestic firmspropensity to collude and prompting foreign firms. 2005 artículo científico 1665-2045 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32314102 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323 Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época application/pdf Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XIV |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_32314102 |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. |
| spellingShingle | Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried? Alfonso Mendieta Economía y Finanzas antidumping tacit collusion price competition repeated interaction Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried? Alfonso Mendieta Economía y Finanzas antidumping tacit collusion price competition repeated interaction Administered protection is not the only outcome of antidumpingmeasures. This paper suggests a basic model of repeated interactionbetween a domestic and a foreign firm. Competing in prices in the importingmarket, antidumping action serves as the means to enforce andsustain tacit collusion between the firms. The main result is that pricedistortions by antidumping policy are a departure point for the achievementof the collusive outcome. Discount factors of future profits are alteredrelative to those observed under free trade, delaying domestic firmspropensity to collude and prompting foreign firms. 2005 artículo científico 1665-2045 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32314102 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323 Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época application/pdf Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XIV |
| title | Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried? |
| topic | Economía y Finanzas antidumping tacit collusion price competition repeated interaction |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32314102 |