The Case against Evaluative Realism
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Redalyc
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| Natura: | Artículo científico |
| Lingua: | en |
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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2006
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| _version_ | 1876422355144671232 |
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| author | Dan LÓPEZ DE SA |
| author_facet | Dan LÓPEZ DE SA |
| contents | The Case against Evaluative Realism Dan LÓPEZ DE SA Filosofía metaethics flexibility internalism causal efficacy Evaluative realism In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had. 2006 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730801003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.3 Vol.21 |
| format | Artículo científico |
| id | redalyc_339730801003 |
| institution | Redalyc |
| language | en |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publisher | Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea |
| spellingShingle | The Case against Evaluative Realism Dan LÓPEZ DE SA Filosofía metaethics flexibility internalism causal efficacy Evaluative realism The Case against Evaluative Realism Dan LÓPEZ DE SA Filosofía metaethics flexibility internalism causal efficacy Evaluative realism In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had. 2006 artículo científico 0495-4548 https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730801003 en http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=3397 THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia application/pdf Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia (España) Num.3 Vol.21 |
| title | The Case against Evaluative Realism |
| topic | Filosofía metaethics flexibility internalism causal efficacy Evaluative realism |
| url | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730801003 |